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ABSTRACT
Environmental issues have become increasingly important in the political arena, particularly
with growing concern over the "greenhouse effect", a potential global climatic warming
caused by increases in anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. The United States
alone accounts for 25% of the worldwide emissions of C02, the most important of the
greenhouse gases. The generation of electric power is responsible for one-third of UnitedStates CO2 emissions in addition to emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, also
greenhouse gases. In the long term, strategies to reduce such emissions will probably
concentrate on non-fossil fuel sources, such as nuclear energy, solar energy, or biomass.
Near term strategies for the reduction of these emissions, important because of lengthy time
lags in the climate system, must concentrate on existing technologies. These strategies
must also be compatible with other environmental and societal goals.
This study examines the emissions reduction potential in two regions of the United States
electric power industry. Utility accepted models and data have been utilized to minimize
concern over structural simplifications and parametric errors. Seven potential strategies
were examined to determine their effectiveness for the reduction of CO2 emissions. The
costs and additional environmental effects of these strategies were also calculated.
The study finds that some carbon emissions, and large amounts of other environmental
emissions, can be reduced at little or no cost. Larger amounts of emissions reductions
appear to be possible at higher cost. The tradeoffs between cost and emissions reduction
are quantified to facilitate strategy choice. Processes for the selection of economically
feasible and politically acceptable climate change policies, through the use of such analyses,
are discussed.
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Chapter One - Introduction
The New Agenda
For most of modem history, international relations was confined to
one topic: military security. Each nation could operate independently as
long as military threats to its borders and people could be countered. As
travel and communications capabilities increased, another topic entered the
agenda: economics. With growing interdependence, security and economy
became intermingled, and international relations became increasingly
complex. Now, the international agenda has once again expanded to
include a new topic: environment. With the discovery of environmental
problems which extend beyond national boundaries, such as acid rain,
ozone depletion, and global warming, environmental concerns have
increasingly become international concerns. Just as the line dividing
economy from security has faded, so now are the lines dividing environ-
ment from the other two.
The New Ethic
Environmental concern is not new. In fact the modern environ-
mental movement in America traces its roots as far back as the 1860s.
George Perkins, Marsh, who warned of the dangers of swamp draining and
tree cutting as early as 1864, has been referred to by some as the "first
modem environmentalist"'. What is new, however, is the global scale of
the issues that are now encompassed under the flag of environmentalism.
1 McKibben, 1989.
These global environmental effects have brought with them a general
uneasiness about the possible irreversibility of the large-scale environ-
mental damage which people may be causing.
With this uneasiness has come an increased call for a new ethical
framework which incorporates the environment as something worth pre-
serving in its own right or, indeed, as something which people have no
right to exploit for their own purposes. This sentiment also has deep roots,
traceable to Marsh and to Thoreau's Walden, written at about the same
time. Only recently, however, has the sentiment seemed popular, at least
superficially, on such a wide scale.
Environmentalist Bill McKibben recently made the best seller list
with his book The End of Nature 2. Hailed as the greatest call to
environmental action since Rachel Carson's Silent Spring exposed the
dangers of DDT3, The End of Nature puts forth as its thesis that nature is
no longer in any way independent from mankind and has therefore ended
being what it used to be. McKibben suggests that nature must be preserved
and respected not for its measurable contributions to mankind's standard of
living, but "for itself". Other recent authors have made suggestions along
the same line4.
While debate over the validity of such arguments is well beyond the
scope of this discussion, it is worth noting that the voices of McKibben and
others like him ,are being heard. The president of the United States felt the
need to cast himself as an environmentalist as part of his election strategy,
despite the sometimes undesirable connotations which used to be attached to
2 McKibben, 1989.
3 Carson, 1962.
4 Stone, 1987.
the label. Margaret Thatcher, who once called environmentalists "the
enemy within", stated in the past year that "the most pressing task which
faces us at the international level is to negotiate a framework convention on
climate change, a sort of good-conduct guide for all nations." Earth Day -
1990 celebrations became popular and widespread events worthy of healthy
corporate support.
The Emotional Impact of Climate Change
The emergence of this new environmental awareness seems to have
been catalyzed by one topic in particular - the "greenhouse effect." The
concept of the greenhouse effect - potential catastrophic climate change
caused by everyday human activity - is frightening. The issue has
galvanized the environmental community, and the media, like no other
environmental concern before it.
Perhaps the attention given to the greenhouse effect is due to the
excuse it seems to give for other measures which many environmentalists
and others have sought for years - conservation, solar power, saving the
tropical rain forests. Perhaps the attention is caused by a vague feeling of
confirmation about fears that something in the environment "had to give"
eventually. Perhaps the attention is due to climate effects which are
probably unrelated to the greenhouse effect - increasing temperatures in
cities, the United States drought of 1988. Perhaps, of course, the direst
predictions are correct and the attention is warranted. Nevertheless, the
attention has been substantial.
In 1989, after Time had made its "Planet of the Year" declaration,
the magazine began running regular articles about environmental issues, all
of them fronted by a logo of the earth held together by twine, and the
subheading "Endangered Earth" 5. A recent New York Times front page
story on the first day of President Bush's global warming conference
quoted polls which found that 71% of Americans felt environmental
protection was worth increased government spending and higher taxes, and
that 56% felt it was worth the loss of jobs in their local community 6. The
Boston Globe found an editor ("Common Sense and Global Warming") and
columnist ("Yuppie Credos and Greenhouse Effect Hypocrisy") sharply
disagreeing with each other in opposite pages of a December, 1989,
editorial section7. The examples are endless. Greenhouse expert Stephen
Schneider refers to the new branch of climate science which the extensive
newspaper and television debate has created as "mediarology" S.
The science, engineering, and policy communities have taken up the
call to action with a fervor as well. The last decade has seen an exponential
growth in the literature on the subject. The last several years have seen
numerous academic conferences on the issue 9. International meetings of
political leaders have been held on the issuelo. Even religious leaders have
joined the fray, meeting with scientists and politicians to discuss the moral
and ethical sides of the issue at the Global Forum of Spiritual and Parlia-
mentary Leaders on Human Survival (Moscow, January 1990). Many new
5 Time. various 1989 and 1990.
6 New York Times. 4/17/90.
7 Boston Globe, 12/17/89.
8 Schneider, 1989.
9 Examples include the Climate Institute's 2nd North American Conference on Preparing for Climate
Change, December 6-8, 1988, Washington, DC, and the MIT Energy Laboratory's Conference on Energy
and the Environment in the 21st Century, March 26-28, 1990, Cambridge, MA.
10 In the past six months, George Bush has addressed the United Nations International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (February, 1990), convened a US conference on "global change" (April 1990), and
announced an intention to host a conference for the negotiation of a framework treaty in November.
institutions have been created whose sole purpose is the study of climate
change 11.
What is all the furor about? If the doomsayers are to be believed,
the furor is about the possibility of changes in climate during the next
century more dramatic than the human race has ever seen. The furor is
about frequent droughts in United States agricultural areas, intensified
hurricanes, plant and animal species which cannot adapt quickly enough,
sea levels so high that coastal cities and some island countries may
disappear, political and social changes which will occur with shifting
agricultural lands, deserts, resources, and population. Ultimately, of
course, the furor is about whether any of this will really happen and
whether there is anything which can be done to delay it or stop it from
happening.
Overview of Study
This study examines the problem of potential climate change, and the
formulation of policies to face climate change, primarily through a detailed
study of a small, yet significant, portion of the problem: the United States
electric power sector. Chapter 2 discusses the general scientific back-
ground of the climate change issue and briefly summarizes previous studies
which are similar to this one. Chapter 3 discusses the realities of the
carbon dioxide issue, justifying the formulation of the present study and
providing a theoretical framework for the modeling analysis and policy
discussions which follow. Chapter 4 explains the modeling effort which
was used for the detailed analysis of various policy strategies for emissions
11 For instance, the MIT Center for Global Change Science, U.S. Department of State's Office of Climate
Change, and Britain's Center for the Prediction of Climate Change.
reduction in two regions of the U.S. electric power sector. Chapter 5
outlines the results of this modeling effort. Chapter 6 discusses the
underlying technical and economic characteristics of the successful
strategies. The implications of these characteristics for final strategy
choice are then discussed. Chapter 7 examines the political context in
which climate change policies must be implemented and recommends
policies through which such policies might be formed. Likely policy
outcomes, based on the modeling results and the political context, are then
outlined. Chapter 8 briefly discusses the more general lessons of the study
and how similar methodologies might be applied in other sectors of human
activity in order to address the climate change issue.
Chapter Two - Facing Climate Chan e
Complexity and Controversy
The problem of the "greenhouse effect", or perhaps more accurately
global climate change, is undeniably complex, with the state of scientific
knowledge varying from the factual to the uncertain and even purely
speculative. This scientific complexity and uncertainty is responsible in
great part for the difficulty associated with establishing effective climate
change policy or even deciding whether or not to do so. There are a few
general points on which there is fair degree of scientific consensus, some of
which will be discussed here. There are numerous explanations of the
science of climate change to which those desiring greater detail are
referred 12.
The underlying principle of the greenhouse effect is fairly
straightforward and undisputed, and is best illustrated by examining the
basic energy fluxes of the earth-atmospheric system. These basic processes
are pictured in Figure 2-1. Shortwave radiation from the sun is incident
upon the earth's atmosphere. A portion of this radiation is reflected back
to space, off of clouds, for example, some is absorbed and the remaining
portion passes through to the surface. The earth reflects some percentage
of this radiation 13 and absorbs the rest. The absorbed radiation is then
reemitted indirectly, through the evaporation of water, or directly, as
longwave radiation (heat). This change in character of the radiation is
significant. Certain chemicals in the atmosphere which allowed the
12 Mitchell, 1989b; Ramanathan, 1988; Dickinson, 1986b (nontechnical introduction).
13 This percentage is the earth's "albedo".
The Earth's Radiation Energy Balance
Figure 2-1
Source: Schneider, 1989.
shortwave radiation to pass unaffected when entering the atmosphere will
absorb the longwave radiation which is leaving. These chemicals are the
greenhouse gases, and include water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH 4 ), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and nitrous oxide (N20). Some
portion of the atmospherically absorbed longwave radiation is reemitted to
space, but the remaining portion is reemitted back towards the surface.
This energy which is now "trapped" between the surface and the
atmosphere leads to a rise in surface temperature (and the greenhouse
analogy).
This notion has its origins before this century in the work of Jean-
Baptiste Fourier, who first described the effect 14 and Svante Arrhenius,
who gave the first quantitative discussion of temperature increases due to
atmospheric CO215, and is not seriously in dispute. Likewise, this is not an
undesirable phenomenon. The surface temperature of the earth would be
some 330 C cooler, too cold for life to have developed, were it not for this
effect 16. The new cause for concern, however, is that human activities are
unnaturally increasing the atmospheric concentrations of these greenhouse
gases, and may subsequently be causing a rapid heating of the surface. The
character of this heating - its timing, its magnitude, its distribution, its
effects - are a source of great dispute.
Some "facts" about these characteristics have been developed by gen-
eral agreement ,throughout the concerned scientific community. Whether
these agreements constitute consensus, much less fact, is arguable17.
14 Fourier, 1824.
15 Arrhenius, 1896.
16 Schneider, 1989.
17 Lindzen, 1989; Idso, 1987.
Nevertheless, these statements persist in climate change discussions.
Included among these are the following:
1) Carbon dioxide (C0 2) is presently responsible for
about half of the problem , followed by methane (18%), CFCs
(14%), and N20 (6%)18.
2) Ice core data indicate a strong correlation between
C02 concentrations and surface temperature, although cause
and effect are difficult to establish19.
3) Energy use, in the form of fossil fuel combustion is
responsible for most of the greenhouse gas increase (57%)
followed by agriculture (14%) and alterations of land use
patterns, primarily deforestation (9%)20.
4) Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have increased
steadily since direct measurements began in the late 1950s,
Hawaii. If the trend continues at the same rate -
approximately 4.3% per year - a doubling of atmospheric
C02 concentrations relative to preindustrial levels will occur
by the year 205021.
18 US EPA, 1989.
19 Barnola, etal., 1987; Genthon, eLal., 1987.
20 US EPA, 1989.
21 Oeschger and Siegenthaler, 1988.
5) General climate models agree that a such a doubling
would create an increase in global mean surface temperature
of 1.5 - 4.50C. Models also tend to agree that this warming
would be greater at the poles and less significant near the
equator 22.
6) Among the likely effects of such a change are sea
level rises of 3-5 meters23 and altered precipitation patterns,
with continent interiors becoming drier, and edges of con-
tinents becoming wetter 24.
The effects of such changes are unimaginable and unpredictable from
man's current frame of reference. If temperature changes of the sort
predicted were to occur, it would be beyond the range of human
experience. Indeed, a change of 3-50C occurred in the last 18,000 years
since the height of the last ice age 25. The models indicate the possibility of
such a change within the next century.
The uncertainties are monumental, however. The predictions are
based on the modeling efforts of a few relatively small groups of
scientists26. By definition, models lack detail and must make assumptions
which may or may not account satisfactorily for that detail. The general
climate models, are no exception. The climate is a very complex and
unpredictable system. Changes in the system are only meaningful over
22 Schlesinger and Mitchell, 1987.
23 Robin, 1986; Wigley and Raper, 1987.
24 Hansen, et.al., 1987.
25 Schneider, 1989.
26 Hansen, etal, 1988; Stouffer, et.al., 1989; Wilson and Mitchell, 1987; Washington and Meehl, 1989.
long periods of time. The limits of computer performance and availability
force enormous simplifications. Many significant processes have been
parameterized to approximate the more detailed system realities. Whether
these parameters allow the models to accurately mimic the system, and thus
provide reliable projections of future climate, is not at all clear.
Many effects are not included directly in the models. Foremost
among these are the effects of clouds. Even if the effect of clouds could be
included in the models, scientists are not clear what the effect would be.
Some clouds are highly reflective from above. This reduces the amount of
sunlight incident on the earth, and thus causes a cooling. If a greenhouse
climate caused increased cloud cover, and thus a cooling through this
mechanism, this would be a negative feedback, indicating that the
predictions are too high. On the other hand, the water vapor in some
clouds acts as a greenhouse gas, actually trapping some radiation below the
clouds. If a greenhouse climate caused an increase in these types of clouds,
and thus even more heating, this would be a positive feedback, indicating
that the predictions are too low. Many other feedbacks are possible, and
unaccounted for in the models27.
In any case, the uncertainty about temperature changes is much
greater than the frequently cited 1.5 - 4.50 C temperature range. This
uncertainty has tremendous influence on the desirability of climate change
abatement policies. If the temperature ranges will be larger than predicted,
the need for action may be urgent or there may be nothing which can be
done to avoid catastrophic changes to which the globe is already
committed. If the temperature changes will be smaller - Lindzen suggests
27 Hansen, etal. 1984; Wetherald and Manabe, 1988: Broecker, 1987; Lashof, 1989; Mitchell, et.al.,
1989a; Wang and Stone, 1980.
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a rise of 0.1 0 C28 - who cares? Particularly, should anyone care enough
to make any effort or sacrifice now in order to avoid the change?
The uncertainties in the climate system are responsible for only a
fraction of the complexity which surrounds the issue as a whole. There are
complex and poorly understood interactions with other environmental
problems 29 and with the many varied and essentially fundamental human
activities which exacerbate the greenhouse problem. The existing systems
of electricity use, transportation, and agriculture are all called into
question. Such basic human processes as economic growth and population
growth contribute to the problem. Compounded with the fact that the
problem is global in nature, probably requiring the eventual participation
of many nations not particular predisposed to cooperation with one
another, and the challenges can easily be perceived as insurmountable.
This study can obviously make no attempt to fully answer all of the
questions which the climate change problem raises. What can be stated,
however, is that the potential consequences of doing nothing are great.
Making no effort to determine what policy options exist, and how effective
or feasible they may be, would be foolhardy. This study begins to move in
that direction through a detailed sectoral study, an approach which will be
justified below. It will also be pointed out that the cost of different policy
options ranges widely, from those which are very expensive to those which
cost little or no money. The latter are of particular interest since they
may serve as inexpensive insurance policies against the uncertainties of
climate change.
28 Lindzen, 1989.
29 Smil, 1985; Campbell, 1986.
Studying Climate Change
The climate change issue is a complex one which can be examined in
a variety of ways. This section outlines various approaches which can be
taken in attempts to study the climate change issue and provide policy
alternatives.
Studying the Whole Problem
The most common type of climate change study can be termed
"comprehensive." Since the problem is so large, and the activities which
exacerbate it so ubiquitous, it is reasoned that only a studies which account
for all of the problem can hope to have any impact. The disadvantage of
such formulations is that the studies are predisposed to becoming vague,
unreliable, or full of despair.
Studies become vague when only superficial recommendations can
be made due to the limited or nonexistent nature of the problem analysis.
This is typical of many statements by environmental groups or the media
- i.e., "bum less fossil fuel". While such a recommendation may indeed
suggest an appropriate direction, policy action requires a great deal more
specificity.
Unreliability can occur when specific actions are recommended as a
result of extensive studies or modeling based on large numbers of simplify-
ing assumptions, typical of most studies discussed below. While these types
of study do provide some sense of general policy trends which might be
followed, little information is provided as to which policies should be
implemented where, when they should be implemented, and finally, how,
they should be implemented. Additionally, because of the simplifying
assumptions, little faith is put in them by those who understand the detail of
the concerned technological and political systems.
The final characteristic - despair - is inevitable when one attempts
to encompass the entire problem of climate change under one policy
strategy, as is the attempt of many comprehensive studies. In fact, it often
appears that the only single policy strategy which can be formulated to
encompass the whole problem is a do-nothing strategy in which society
learns to adapt to climate change and perhaps wait for the invention of a
technological fix which will solve the problem. Such policy recommenda-
tions are increasingly popular 30, but tend to treat many significant factors
as trivial detail.
Separating the Chemicals
A second alternative for climate change studies is to concentrate on
particular greenhouse gases, looking for methods of reducing particular
chemical emissions. Since CO 2 is the primary contributor to the problem,
it tends to be the focus of such studies 31. A few other studies have focussed
on CFCs32 or methane 33. The studies of C02 have tended to suffer from
many of the flaws of comprehensive studies. Since the activities which
contribute to the emissions of each of the gases are so varied, superficiality
or despair are often the result here, as well. Additionally, since some CO2
reduction stratqgies might increase methane emissions (increased natural
gas use, for instance), and vice versa, the conclusions of such studies can be
30 Bach, 1984; T.C. Schelling in closing comments at the MIT Energy Laboratory Conference on Energy
and Environment in the 21st Century.
31 Edmonds and Reilly, 1986a, 1986b; Rose,etal., 1983; many others.
32 Ramanathan, 1975; Wigley, 1988.
33 Ehhalt, 1988.
misleading. It should be noted that since CFCs are purely man-made
chemicals, used for a limited number of purposes, such policy formulations
are probably appropriate in this case.
Separating the Sectors
A third possibility is to examine the specific human activities which
lead to the emissions of greenhouse gases. The appeal of this approach is
that this is the level where policies must be implemented. Even policies
which focus on chemical concentrations must alter some aspect of human
behavior in order to be effective. Among the primary activities which are
of interest in the climate change problem are energy use - divided into the
sectors of electric power, transportation, industry, and buildings -
agriculture, and deforestation. The limitation to such a strategy, of course,
is that even if successful policies can be found to appropriately manage one
activity, other activities may be ignored or even unfavorably altered by the
original action.
Separating the Regions
The problem can also be divided spatially. Instead of formulating
global policies, for which there are few mechanisms for implementation or
enforcement, there is some appeal to concentrating on individual nations or
blocks of alliei nations - the OECD or Eastern Europe, for example.
Another common division of this sort is between the industrialized and
non-industrialized countries. Vast differences in economic wealth,
infrastructure, political stability, and past contributions to the problem,
make the character of the problem very different for the developed and
24
less-developed nations. Again, this type of formulation can ignore entire
sections of the problem.
Separating the Time Frames
Finally, mitigation policies can be focussed on a variety of time
scales. This can range from time scales on the order of a century (typical
of comprehensive studies) to very short term studies which examine what
can be done immediately. The latter suffers primarily from its inability to
deal with the dynamics and time lags of the involved systems. The former
lacks reliability. Any attempts to predict energy futures one hundred years
hence should be viewed through the filter of past energy predictions. Not a
single energy expert in 1970 was able to predict what the world of energy
would look like in 1980. The system was poorly understood and subject to
unprecedented shocks. There is no reason to believe that it is any less so
now, particularly over century-long time frames.
Focus of Present Study
The focus of this study is not comprehensive, but rather is directed at
one sector: electric power. The focus is further reduced to regions of the
United States and to a transitional time period of twenty-five years. In
brief, the- rationale for this focus is a desired balance between the
advantages and disadvantages of the possible formulations discussed above.
The system of focus is small enough and well enough understood for
the modeling and analyses to be highly reflective of systemic realities and,
therefore, to have meaningful results. On the other hand, the U.S. electric
power sector is important enough (the specific contribution of this sector to
the global problem is discussed in Chapter 3) that one can hope for policy
actions to have significant impacts on the overall system. The
"transitional" time period was chosen as lengthy enough to capture
important dynamics and time lags, yet short enough to be within a
reasonably predictable time horizon 4 .
Again, this is not an attempt to solve the entire problem. The study
does hope to show what policies might be advisable for altering a specific
aspect of human behavior. It is hoped that the study can also serve as a
model for pursuing answers to the same questions within other sectors of
activity.
Similar Studies
Many studies of the energy / CO2 issue have been conducted. A
brief discussion of these studies will contrast and compare this earlier work
with the present study. Of particular interest are the differences in the
conclusions of several studies which cast doubt on the structural reliability
of models used, as well as the similarities in assumptions across several
studies which may lead to unwarranted consensus between them 35.
Models of energy / CO2 interactions can be characterized along
several dimensions. First, the models differ in scope - some examine the
whole p m , while others examine isolated portions. Second, the
34 The term "transition" has often been used to describe a time period in which the present energy system
changes to a new steady-state ideal - Energy in Transition. 1985 to 2010 (CONAES, 1979); RaXs of He:
The Transition to a Post-Petroleum World (Hayes, 1977); Energy Transitions: Long-Term Perspectives
(Perelman, eLal., 1981); Coal: Bridge to the Future (Wilson, 1980). While this study does focus on a
similar time period, there is no expectation of a steady-state end-point, but merely a recognition that the
dynamics of the system beyond this period ae difficult to forecast or even discuss meaningfully.
35 There are several detailed discussions of many of these studies to which the interested reader is referred:
Keepin, 1986; Rotty and Masters, 1984; Ausubel and Nordhaus, 1983; Goldemberg, et.al, 1985; Perry,
1982; Hamm, 1986.
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models differ in the level of detail with which energy / CO2 interactions
are represented. Third, interactions between the energy system and the
economic system are handled differently. Fourth, the models differ in
their level of aggregation of both geographic regions and separate sectors
of the energy system. Fifth, the models differ substantially in their
handling of both parametric and structural uncertainty.
The primary difference between previous studies and this one is one
of scope. This study is for a relatively short period of time, 25 years, and
for a single activity in limited geographic regions. Most other studies have
been global, long-term (50-200 years) studies. It should be noted that this
study is not completely exceptional in scope, however. Similar types of
studies have been done in Sweden 36 and West Germany 37, for instance.
These studies are complementary to this one since, in order for impact on
the global situation to be maximized, the potential of various strategies
must be evaluated in a variety of sectors and regions.
Ausubel and Nordhaus 38 outline three categories of models, based on
the level of interaction considered between energy and C02. The first
category consists of those which project historical CO2 trends into the
future, with no analysis of root causes, such as energy use. Included
among these are projections based on C02 measurements at Mauna Loa39.
The second category consists of those which are focussed primarily on the
energy system, and to which C02 emissions are essentially a dependent
output stream. Many prominent studies fall into this category4O. The final
36 Bodlund, etal., 1989.
37 Krause, F., 1982.
38 Ausubel and Nordhaus, 1983.
39 Oeschger and Siegenthaler, 1988.
40 IIASA, 1981, 1983; Lovins, 1982; Rotty and Marland, 1981.
category consists of those models in which CO 2 concentrations or emissions
provide some feedback or constraint to the energy system. Primary studies
included in this category are the studies of Edmonds & Reilly and
Nordhaus & Yohe 41 . Many other studies have used one of these two as a
modeling basis42. Because strategies for limiting emissions are considered,
this study is in this category. This last category also includes studies which
link energy / C02 models with C02 / climate (and often climate / economy)
models, attempting to project climatic or economic impacts of energy
use 43. Such links would not be meaningful on a regional basis, and are not
accounted for in this study.
Another distinction concerns the interactions between the energy
system and the economic system. General equilibrium models - those
which attempt to bring the supply and demand for energy and energy
services into equilibrium with other aspects of the global economy - have
not truly been achieved by any of the studies. Most of the models are in
fact partial equilibrium models of the energy system. The study here is, in
fact, only an approximation of a partial equilibrium model, since the
effects of price elasticities are not explicitly examined. The economic
aspect of the model in this study consists only of the utilities desire to
minimize generation costs, given fuel prices and a certain level of demand.
No effort is made to actually predict energy or electricity demand nor is
there any feedback from price to demand. This latter drawback, the
41 Edmonds and Reilly, (et.al.), 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b; Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983.
42 US EPA, 1983, 1989; Araj, 1982; Rose, et.al., 1983; Mintzer, 1987; all use the Edmonds & Reilly
model. Hamm, 1986, used the Nordhaus & Yohe model. Because of distinctly different conclusions, these
two models have served as foils for one another in several settings (NRC, 1983; MIT, 1990).
43 Mintzer, 1987; EPA, 1989; Edmonds and Reilly, 1985a; Edmonds, etal., 1986b.
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inability to account for price-driven demand reduction, undoubtedly
introduces error into the strategy evaluations".
Another distinction is between different levels of aggregation in the
models. Some of the models are globally aggregated, recognizing no
differences between different geographical regions. The Nordhaus & Yohe
model is a primary example. Others are disaggregated into a varying
number of regions - nine in the Edmonds & Reilly model, seven in the
IIASA model, and four in the Manne & Richels model 45. This study is
concerned with a region at a much smaller level than even the Edmonds &
Reilly model, but does not attempt to explicitly account for interactions
with the global system as a whole46. Different levels of aggregation in the
energy system are also considered. Most of the models mentioned here
examine the energy system as a whole. This study focuses only on the
electric power sector.
The final distinguishing characteristic of the studies, and probably
the most important, is the handling of uncertainty. This uncertainty can be
of two forms: parametric or structural47. Parametric uncertainty refers to
the inability to predict precise values for numbers used in the models.
Examples of such numbers might be fuel prices, population growth, price
elasticities, and so on. Structural uncertainty refers to questions about the
validity of the model itself. Models are, by definition, simplifications of
44 For instance, in this model, a carbon tax has the effect of causing the utility to reduce carbon emissions
while generating a given level of demand. Costs of electricity generation are subsequently higher than they
would have otherwise been. In reality, such a price increase should cause some reduction in demand (with
further effects on costs and emissions), but this feedback is not accounted for explicitly in this study.
45 Manne, 1990a; Manne and Richels, 1990b, 1990c.
46 Even the US regions studied here are somewhat aggregated, however, since scale approximations of the
systems have been used. See Chapter 4.
4 Keepin, 1986.
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reality. The extent to which a model distorts reality through these
simplifications is generally unquantifiable and uncertain.
Parametric uncertainty is addressed through a variety of methods.
Many studies, including this one, develop a set of scenarios based on best
guesses of ranges in uncertain parameters, and then examine how model
results change across these scenarios. Sensitivity analysis examines the
changes in final output which result from incremental changes in uncertain
parameters. Those parameters which cause the widest changes in outputs
are the most "sensitive", and are, therefore, most important for ensuring
accurate results.
A second (and not mutually exclusive) approach, adapted by
Nordhaus and Yohe, uses a probabilistic method. Many scenarios are run
based on wide ranges in parametric uncertainties. A small number of these
scenarios are then chosen at random for analysis. Percentile ranges for
model outputs (i.e., C02 emissions) are then calculated based on the
random sample48.
Structural uncertainty is much more problematic. For instance,
Keepin points out that the sensitivity analyses of the two most ubiquitous
models - Edmonds & Reilly and Nordhaus & Yohe - yield vastly
different results49. Sensitivity analysis of the Nordhaus & Yohe model
revealed that the "substitution parameter", a number indicating the ease
with which noqfossil fuels can substitute for fossil fuels, was the single
most important parameter in the determination of carbon emissions. In
Edmonds & Reilly, however, carbon emissions were very robust
(insensitive) to the equivalent parameter. The second and third most
48 The greatest difficulty with this method is the hidden assumption that all scenarios are equally likely.
49 Keepin, 1986.
important parameters in Edmonds & Reilly - exogenous energy efficiency
and income elasticity of demand in developing countries - are not even
included in the Nordhaus & Yohe model. Clearly, there is structural
uncertainty in one or both of the models 50. Which is a more accurate
approximation of reality? Since both make sweeping assumptions about the
energy system itself (not about parameters), it is unclear if either of these
models is producing meaningful results. Whether skepticism of these
models is justified is a moot point. Such discrepancies automatically foster
skepticism which creates barriers to the discussion and formulation of
policy. The choice of models in this study was based fundamentally on the
assertion that structural uncertainty must be minimized if models are to
have credibility with those who understand the structural realities of the
system.
50 There is even wide discrepancy among the conclusions of studies which all use the Edmonds & Reilly
model.
Chapter Three - The Realities of Carbon Dioxide
A Theoretical Framework
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the selection,
examination, and evaluation of possible approaches to the CO2 / electric
power issue. The starting point of this discussion will be the traditional
conception of the more general C02 / energy issue - "the pollution
equation." It will be shown that the pollution equation does not indicate the
hopelessness of the problem, as is usually concluded, but rather a variety of
conceivable policy levers for significant reductions in carbon dioxide
emissions. The importance of various regions and sectors of human
activity will be examined quantitatively, highlighting the importance of the
US electric power sector to the global problem. Finally, the realities of the
electric power sector and its carbon emissions will be examined in detail,
highlighting the role of such factors as system operating rules and choice of
technology, as well as the policy levers which they provide.
Traditional Formulation - The "Pollution Equation"
Erlich and Holdren 51 first suggested the links between pollution,
population, economic growth, and technology by combining such factors in
a simple identity formula as follows:
Pollution Activity GNPPollution (Activit GN ) (Population) (Population)Activity GP Population
32
51 Erlich and Holdren, 1971.
The (Pollution / Activity) term is a measure of the polluting nature
of the activity itself, largely a function of the technologies used by the
activity. The (Activity / GNP) term is the "intensity" of the activity, or the
amount of the activity used to generate one dollar of GNP 52. The (GNP /
Population) term is a measure of the average standard of living of a
society. The equation has gained wide acceptance, yet while the equation
can indeed provide insight into the pollution problem, particularly if
examined at a deeper and more disaggregate level, the conclusions which
are drawn from the equation are often misleading. A common use of this
equation is to illustrate the factors which contribute to carbon emissions 53
from energy use:
Carbon. Energy GNPCarbon = (E( e )g ( G .P ) (Population)Energy) GNP Population
or, for brevity's sake:
C=(C() ()(P)5 4
where C= Carbon emissions,
E = Energy use,
$ = Dollars of GNP,
and P = Population.
52 Gross National Product. Gross Domestic Product, or any other measure of the level of economic
activity within a society would be acceptable.
53 The term "carbon emissions" will be used interchangeably for "carbon dioxide emissions." In general,
the two are proportional since most of the carbon released from energy use is released as carbon dioxide.
54 Notation of Wei, etal., 1990.
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Although the usage varies, the "energy" in the above equation will be
considered final-use energy, in order to maintain consistency with the
original pollution equation, which addresses human activities. Let us look
at the equation for our specific interest, carbon emissions from electric
power:
C GWHCarbon = (GWH) GNP GNPPopulation ) (Population)Population
C/GWH is marginal carbon emissions (MCE) 55,
GWH/GNP is electricity intensity.
Similar equations might be written for other sectors - transporta-
tion, for example:
C Vehicle-MileCarbon = (Vehicle-mile) ( GNP GNP(Population) (Population)56
A recent MIT conference 57 saw permutations of the pollution
equation in the presentations of no less than five speakers. The formula
55 As with "marginal costs" (i.e., $ / GWH) in an electric power system, this value is marginal to the
system and not necessarily to the technology with which the cost is associated. The marginal costs or
emissions are the a~y cost or emissions per GWH of the technology which is loaded at the margin of
the system.
56 The final energy - primary energy confusion can be alleviated by the explicit addition of a conversion
efficiency term. This iould make the electric power equation
C Fuel Unit GWH GNPCarbon = Fuel ( ) ( ) (Population)Fuel Uni GWH GNP Population
and the transportation equation
C Gal. Oil Vehicle-Mil GNP
Carbon = (al. Oil) Vehicle-mile GNP )Population pulation)
57 Energy and the Environment in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA, March 26-28, 1990.
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where
and
was used to point out the futility of efforts to limit carbon emissions due to
population predictions and economic growth targets58 and the possibility of
the need to limit population or economic growth 59. It is often used to
highlight the importance of energy efficiency or the "immorality" of high
energy intensities in countries such as the United States. A set of brief
notes about the global warming issue released by a group of researchers at
MIT points to the difficulty of reducing all of the factors60 . It is suggested
here that a great deal of subtlety about the carbon emissions problem is
masked by these formulations, or at least by these interpretations.
Among the often overlooked subtleties are the following:
1) The terms of the equation are highly complex, non-
linear functions of many other factors, some of which lead to
interrelations and feedbacks between the terms.
2) The equation applies only to the emissions generated
in a period of time small enough to assume fixed levels of
energy use, GNP, and population during that period (i.e., a
year). Rates of change are often ignored.
3) Since technology choice, energy use, economic
activity, apd population vary across regions, the equation only
applies to one particular region, with a global assessment
requiring a summation of such terms. There is a dominance
58 Yoichi Kaya, University of Tokyo.
59 John Gibbons, Office of Technology Assessment.60 Wei, etal., 1990.
by some of the terms (i.e., those representing industrialized
nations) which can shift over time.
4) Since emissions vary across technologies and fuels,
the term for any particular region will also be a summation
across technology/fuel combinations. There may be domi-
nances here, as well, due to variations in carbon content of
fuels, technological effects on carbon emissions, efficiencies,
relative presence of different technologies, relative utilization
of different technologies, and the characteristics of, in our
case, the power system itself. Changes in these factors can be
due to altered use of existing technologies (altered dispatch
rules, fuel switching, etc.) or through changes in the tech-
nology stock itself.
5) Only the first term, marginal carbon emissions, can
go to zero61. If this term is zero, the values of the other terms
will have no effect on emissions levels. Not only can this term
theoretically go to zero, but it does so with the use of many
non-fossil fuel sources (i.e., hydroelectric, nuclear, solar,
wind, geothermal, biomass, etc.). While technology/fuel
switches may be undesirable economically, politically, or for
other environmental reasons, this factor is the only term which
has no theoretical limit in the long run. This comment is most
relevant with reference to improvement in energy intensity,
61 Assuming, of course, that populations or GNPs of zero would place concerns about carbon emissions
very low on a societal priority list and that a non-electric society is an unlikely development.
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which may be the most cost-effective method for receiving
short term emissions reductions, but has limits to the amount
of improvement which can be achieved 62.
These observations indicate three possible methods for revealing
policy levers for the reduction of carbon emissions:
1) Cross-regional order-of-magnitude approximations
of terms can identify those regions in which emissions
reduction will be the most effective, and those regions in
which reduction would be meaningless in global terms. For
example, such an analysis below leads to the conclusion that a
worldwide 20% reduction in carbon emissions could be
achieved by a slightly larger reduction in a few regions, even
with an allowance for increased emissions in other less
dominant regions.
2) Analysis of rates of change in terms, again in a cross-
regional comparison, could help identify the times at which the
dominances found above might shift. Such comparisons can
also help quantify the rates at which technological substitution
and efficiency improvements must occur in orcer to
simultaneously satisfy environmental, economic growth, and
population growth constraints.
62 This is much like weight loss - no matter how much excess weight one has, some finite amount is
necessary and cannot disappear. This should not be interpreted to dilute the possibility that the limit to
conservation, while certainly above zero, may indeed be sufficiently below present levels to allow for
environmentally acceptable reduction in carbon emissions.
3) Most important for this study, detailed analysis of
those factors which contribute to the marginal carbon
emissions and energy intensity terms can help with the
formulation and evaluation of various technology or policy
strategies.
Dominant Effects
We must first recognize that the pollution equation, as originally
stated, applies only to one particular region, where a region is defined as
any geographical area for which we can assume a single value for popula-
tion, GNP63, or any other value of interest in the equation. Therefore, to
determine global emissions of carbon, we must look at a summation of
terms:
M
Ctot= Cj
j=1
where M is the total number of regions,
and Cj is the total carbon emissions from region j.
Similarly, the original pollution equation assumes a fixed value for
marginal carbon emissions. Since carbon emissions vary according to
technology and fuel use, and the characteristics of similar technologies may
also vary across regions (i.e., newer coal plants in the industrialized world
63 Gross "National" Product may be used in this definition to refer to the level of economic activity within
a region which is actually subnational (i.e., the Northeast United States) or supranational (i.e., Western
Europe).
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may be more efficient than older coal plants elsewhere), an additional
summation across technology / fuel combinations is also necessary to fully
account for these differences. This can be stated:
M N
Ctot= 1 Cijj=1 i=1
where M = Total number of regions,
N = Total number of technology/fuel combinations in region j,
and Cij = Carbon emissions in region j from technology i.
If we make an assumption (for the purposes of an order-of-
magnitude) that fuels are similar in carbon content globally (i.e., coal used
in the US contains the same weight of carbon per BTU of energy as coal
used in the USSR), we can restate the equation as follows:
N M
Ctot = Y ( )i Eij
i=1 j=1
where (C/E)i is the carbon per unit energy of fuel i,
and Eij is the energy usage of fuel i in region j.
Note that we have also aggregated the original pollution equation,
collapsing the GNP and population terms within the energy term. Since we
have data of regional fuel use, this is more convenient for this calculation.
We are not particularly interested at this stage in examining the factors
which contribute to energy use (clearly GNP and population are among
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them). This also illustrates that the original pollution equation is actually at
a rather arbitrary level of aggregation. The equation can be expanded or
collapsed depending on the purpose at hand.
Returning to our calculation, we can use values for the global
average carbon content of particular fuels - coal, oil and gas - given by
Marland 64 and data on regional energy use by fuel type from the BP
Statistical Review of Energy65 we can estimate 1987 carbon emissions as
shown in Table 3-1.
An aggregated regional distribution of these carbon emissions is
shown in Figure 3-1. Of note here is that the US alone accounts for nearly
a quarter of the global carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The
OECD countries together account for nearly one half, and the top three
regions - the US, the USSR, and western OECD countries - account for
60% of the total. This implies that a global reduction of 20% could be
obtained through a 33% cut in the largest three contributing regions or by
a 40% cut in the OECD alone, assuming no changes elsewhere. If
contributions were to double in the developing countries66 , global
emissions could still be cut by 20% with a reduction of 40% in the
industrialized countries 67. This should not be interpreted as advocacy of
any particular reduction targets, regionally or globally, but only as a
demonstration that significant dominance of the carbon emissions problem
is held by a feW countries and regions68. Reductions, or the lack of such
64 Marland, 1982. These are the numbers used by the Edmonds and Reilly model (i.e.,Edmonds and
Reilly, 1985a).
65 British Petroleum, 1988.
66 Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, Africa, Middle East, and China.
67 United States, OECD, USSR, and other Centrally Planned Economies.
68 Similar calculations by others suggest an even larger disparity than indicated here (Edmonds and Reilly,
1985a; MacKenzie, 1988). This indicates the possibility of even greater impacts associated with emissions
reduction impacts in the larger regions.
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Fossil Fuel Use and Carbon Emissions by Region
Source: Brtish Petroleum, 1988.
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Region Oil (mtoe) Gas (mtoe) Coal (mtoe) Carbon (Tg)
United States 763.4 431.9 452.9 1323
Canada 69.4 41.2 33.4 114
Western Europe 585.2 206.7 259.0 854
Australasia 32.8 18.1 41.8 79
Japan 208.1 36.4 68.5 258
Latin America 220.6 73.4 22.7 244
Middle East 109.6 51.3 2.3 121
Africa 84.4 31.2 69.1 156
South Asia 61.0 17.6 124.2 1 84
Southeast Asia 125.0 15.9 45.8 1 5 6
China 103.9 12.8 553.4 647
USSR 449.2 520.2 378.9 1045
Other Cent. Planned 125.9 99.1 334.3 495
Total 2938.5 1555.8 2386.3 5677
Table 3-1
Worldwide Carbon Emissions by Region
11.61%
35%
8.8f
2.7% 4.32 4.37% 6.05%
4.Sourc32e: 437%
Source: British Petroleum, 1988.
uS
West OECD
East OECD
Lat Am
S/SE Asra
Africa
Mid. East
Other CPE
China
USSR
Figure 3-1
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reductions, in these regions drive the level of global emissions and will
continue to do so in the near future.
Rates of Chan=e
To gain some perspective on how this situation can change over time,
particularly as a function of economic growth, we will again return to the
original carbon / energy equation and aggregate as follows:
c=(-) ($)
where
and
$ = GNP,
C/$ is carbon intensity.
The time rate of change in emissions, is then:
dC d C
dt dt [()* ($ ) ]
C d () + d(C
($> i (i.)
For emissions to decrease, dC/dt must be less than zero. If we
assume positive economic growth (d/dt ($) > 0 ):
C(=-N'd (•
ddt (C/$)
(C/$)
d* d()
dd($)dt
>[ 1($)
where, x' indicates the rate of change of variable x relative to its total value
(these rates are approximately equivalent to percentage rates of change
when the values are small)69. Economic growth, for instance, is then
represented by:
($) = ($)o e($)Yt
where ($)o is the GNP at time zero.
This implies that percentage improvements (that is, decreases) in
carbon intensity must outweigh percentage rates of economic growth. This
may be disaggregated again to show that the negative sum of percentage
changes in marginal carbon emissions (C/E) and energy intensity (E/$)
must be greater than percentage increases in standard of living and
population in order for carbon emissions to decrease, as follows:
- [ (C/E)' + (E/$)' ] > ($/P)' + P'
This is perhaps intuitively obvious, merely stating that for global
carbon emissiops to decline, in conjunction with growth in population and
standard of living, improvements in marginal carbon emissions and energy
intensity must be faster. As with the static case of before, it is useful to
account for regional differences in order to identify where and when
69 Notation again from Wei, et.al., 1990.
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changes must occur, particularly given likely population and economic
growth rates. If we look at the same equation and account for summations
across regions:
dC
dt
where
and
dN
dtii= 1
C
(C/$)i and ($)i are the carbon intensity and GNP of region i,
N is the number of regions.
N
i=l
N
i=l
C[ ( )i ddt
C[ (ý)
($)i + ($)i *
d*
* ($)i] +
N
i=l
CTgi
d[ ($)i *4
Again, to decrease emissions, dC/dt < 0, which implies:
N
-
i= 1
N
-
1= 1
* dC
[ ($)i d"$tti
*($)i dCdt P
- X [ (C)i * (C/$)'i ]
i=1
dC
dt
C
(~iii
* d($)i
*l(UxN>
i=1
N
> i
i= 1
C
ICýi
C
* [(C/$)i d
kt$)i]
i=1
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N NN Ci N Ci
- ;[ *(C/$ > ($)'ii=l o i=l
This final equation states that the summation of percentage im-
provements in carbon intensity from all regions, weighted by the relative
levels of carbon emissions from those regions, must outweigh the
summation of economic growth rates, again weighted by carbon emissions.
As before, this implies that some dominance is present. Improvements in
carbon intensity in large carbon emitters will have the largest positive
effect. Economic growth in these countries would have the largest negative
impact. Contributions by less dominant regions might have little impact.
If we accept certain economic growth rates to be inevitable or
desirable, what rates of improvement in carbon intensity would be required
to reduce emissions, and where? Using predictions of economic growth
from Edmonds and Reilly 70, we see that an overall rate of improvement in
carbon intensity of 2.4% would be necessary to reduce carbon emissions in
conjunction with growth. If improvements were made in the US alone, 8%
yearly improvement would be sufficient to cause a decrease in global
emissions. If this were expanded to the countries of the OECD, 4.1%
annual improvements would be required. Examining the largest three
contributing regions (US, Western OECD, and the USSR), a 3.2% rate of
improvement would be sufficient. These numbers assume no improve-
ments or losses in carbon intensity rates elsewhere.
Presumably, this dominance will shift from the industrialized world
to the developing world. Obviously, the timing of this shift depends
70 Edmonds and Reilly, 1985a. Approximately 2% for industrialized regions, 3.8% for developing regions.
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greatly on the rates of change in the factors of interest. If percentage rates
of change in all factors are assumed to be constant (admittedly not possible
or desirable over the long term for either positive or negative growth
rates), then the carbon emissions over time are exponentially growing (or
decreasing) according to:
C = Co eC't
Disaggregating into two regions, "North" (consisting of the
industrialized regions defined earlier) and "South" (all remaining regions):
C = Cs + Cn = (Cso + Cno) e(Cs' + Cn')t
The time at which the contribution from each region is equal (Cs =
Cn) is found by:
In (Cno / Cso)T= Cs'- Cn'
Using the same economic growth rates as before, if carbon intensity
improvement rates remain at today's values, the contribution from the two
regions will not be equal for 72 years. With moderate improvements in
carbon intensity in the North of 3% per year, the shift in dominance would
occur in 32 years. Rapid improvements of 8% per year in the North
would move this forward to 15 years. The implications of these numbers
are that even if substantial improvements are made consistently in the
industrialized countries, there will be some significant time lag before the
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developing countries will become equivalent contributors to total carbon
emissions, even given growth in standard of living and population. The
difficulty of gaining the participation of developing countries in emissions
reduction programs, particularly programs in which the industrialized
countries have not yet participated, is often cited as a barrier to climate
change mitigation policies. The realities of the situation, however, seem to
indicate that not only can policy measures in large contributing countries
have large impact, but the delay associated with the shift in dominance to
the developing countries is large - possibly large enough to allow for
demonstration of the effectiveness and economics of emissions reduction in
the industrialized world and for the transfer of technology and capital to
the developing world.
Potential for SuDiv Technology
As mentioned previously, there are numerous factors which
contribute to the marginal carbon emissions term. Since this term may be
the key lever for manipulation of carbon emissions from electric power,
examination of these factors may provide some illumination of the problem
and its potential solutions.
Let us further disaggregate this term, examining the carbon emitted
over any particular time period, T, in a particular electric power system.
The marginal carbon emissions of the system are a weighted sum of the
marginal emissions from each individual technology type71:
71 Units are classed within a single technology types if all characteristics of the units are identical,
including fuel type used. At the finest grain level, this summation could be across single generating units
in order to fully account for differences.
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N C GWHi
MCEsys = 1 (iGwi) (GWHsys
i=l
N GWHi
= 1 (MCEi) (GWHsys
i=l sys
where N = Total number of technologies in the system,
GWHi = Total GWH produced by a technology i,
and GWHsys = Total GWH produced by the system,
subject to Y GWHi = GWHsys.
The importance of the weighting term (GWHi / GWHsys), which
represents the fraction of the total system energy which is derived from
any particular technology, is evident. If the level of utilization of a tech-
nology is low, a low MCEi term will not have much effect on overall
system emissions. This weighting term will be revisited later.
For many renewable technologies, such as solar or hydro, the
marginal carbon emissions are zero. For those technologies which utilize
an input fuel, marginal carbon emissions can be expressed:
C MMBTUMCEi = (MMBTU) GWHi
where MMBTU = the amount of energy in the fuel 72 ,
and MMBTU/GWHi = the heat rate of the technology, HRi.
72 This is an industry standard unit which can be confusing. An MMBTU is a 106 BTUs, not 109.
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Since carbon emissions are almost completely derived from carbon
contained within the fuel, the Carbon / MMBTU term may be expressed
C emitted C in fuel unit of fuel
MM in fuel ) unit of fuel MMBTU
where unit of fuel could be tons of coal, barrels of oil, etc.
and unit of fuel / MMBTU is the inverse of the heating value, HV.
The carbon throughput (C emitted / C in fuel) is only less than one if
there is incomplete combustion or if carbon is scrubbed from flue gases 74.
Carbon / MMBTU is directly related to carbon - hydrogen ratios within
fuels. Of the fossil fuels, coal has the highest Carbon / MMBTU ratio
(approximately 0.03 tons C / MMBTU), followed by oil (.022) and natural
gas (.017)75. Nuclear technologies utilize a fuel, but release no carbon.
Therefore, for technologies with input fuels:
C emitted C in fuel 1
MCE = (C in fue (Unit of fuel)i
73 Note that the disaggregation of the (Pollutant / MMBTU) term is undesirable when dealing with
pollutants which depend on technological conditions and not necessarily contents of the fuel. NOx
emissions, which depend on boiler temperatures and pressures, are one example.
74 For other pollutants, the (Pollutant emitted / Pollutant in fuel) term can be significan'y less than one.
For example, etrofitting of coal plants with scrubbers to remove sulfur dioxide emissions is an effort to
lower this term to 03, 0.1, or below.
75 These numbers are often expressed in grams per megajoule (g/MJ), or equivalently, Tg/EJ. The
numbers given correspond to 25.8 g/MJ for coal, 18.9 g/MJ for oil, and 14.6 g/MJ for gas. These numbers
are calculated directly from EPRI data for typical fuels, and are intended to be compatible with assumptions
made in the EPRI technology data which was used in the modeling portion of this study. The values are
generally larger than those given by Marland and used by Edmonds and Reilly (23.8, 19.2, and 13.7 g/MJ
for coal, oil, and gas, respectively) and smaller than those given by Wei, et.al. (27.6, 22.7, and 15.8,
respectively). Note that the sizes of these numbers relative to one another is essentially the same in all
three sets, with the exception of oil in the EPRI-derived set, which is lower relative to coal than in the
other two.
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To gain some perspective on this outcome, let us examine the
marginal carbon emissions for various fossil fuel-based generation alterna-
tives in the United States, both existing and suggested. These are summa-
rized in Figure 3-2.
Ranges given for particular technologies are reflective of the
differing emissions characteristics associated with differences in age and
size of power plants within any particular class of technology. Since the
fuel used by any particular class of technology is the same, varying
marginal carbon emissions are due to differences in efficiency. In general,
older and smaller plants are the least efficient. Of note in Figure 3-2, is
that within the existing systems, large emissions reductions could be
obtained if all plants were as efficient as the most efficient existing plant of
that class. For instance, the difference between the least efficient existing
coal plant in the region (391 tons C / GWH) and the most efficient (265
tons / GWH) represents a 32% reduction. The second point of interest, is
that while oil and gas technologies are generally lower in marginal carbon
emissions than coal technologies, this is not necessarily the case. Third,
combined cycle technologies, due to high efficiencies, have the lowest
marginal carbon emissions within each fuel class. Finally, the existing
fossil fuel technology with the lowest marginal carbon emissions, natural
gas-fired gas turbine / combined-cycle 76 (139 tons C / GWH), is lower than
typical existing coal plants (= 330 tons C / GWH) by over 55%.
It has already been stated that the pollution equation does not apply
solely to carbon emissions. Just as we have done for marginal carbon
emissions, we can compare the marginal emissions of any other pollutant
76 Fuel cells are even lower, but are not yet commercially viable.
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for various technologies. This is particularly interesting for sulfur diox-
ide, perhaps the most well-known of the pollutants emitted from electric
power. The marginal sulfur dioxide emissions (MSE), tons SO2 / GWH, of
the same fossil fuel technologies, are shown in Figure 3-3.
The large marginal SO2 emissions of the existing uncontrolled coal
capacity, relative to other technologies, suggest that these technologies
represent a dominant contributor to the total emissions of this pollutant
from the electric power sector. We will see later (Chapter 5) that this is
indeed the case. Note also, that while a general decline in marginal S02
emissions can be observed as one moves from coal to oil to gas
technologies, larger carbon emitting technologies are not necessarily also
larger SO2 emitting technologies. This complicates the process of tech-
nology choice.
Let us now revisit the (GWHi / GWHsys) term, which provides the
weighting values for the emissions from specific technologies. It should be
reiterated here that this term is very important. Installation of technologies
with low marginal carbon emissions will not result in lower system
emissions unless energy generation from higher marginal emission
technologies is displaced. The amount of generation from any particular
technology is a function of the system (such elements as the capacity mix
and dispatch rules), the characteristics of demand on the system, the
availability of yarious technologies, and the marginal costs associated with
operating specific technologies (including fuel prices).
Disaggregating:
GWHi GWHi GWHi-pot GWHs-pot
GWHsys WHi-pot GWHsyspot) GWHsys
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where GWHi = GWH generated by technology i,
GWHi-pot = Potential GWH generated by technology i,
GWHsys = GWH generated by the system,
and GWHs-pot = Potential GWH generated by the system.
The first term, (GWHi / GWHi-pot), is the capacity factor of the
technology - the amount of energy which was generated from the
technology relative to the amount which would have been generated had the
unit been running at full load for the entire time period. This term is the
most complex of these, depending on many factors. We will leave this
term for revisitation.
The second term, (GWHi-pot / GWHs-pot) is equivalent to the fraction
of the system capacity mix which is represented by the technology. This is
due to the fact that the time period of concern is constant for the two
terms. This is expressed:
GWHi-pot GWi
GWHs-pot GWsys
The third term, (GWHs-pot / GWHsys), is the inverse of the usage of
the system. That is, (GWHsys / GWHs-pot), is essentially the "capacity
factor" of the system. This term is independent of the technology-specific
terms and can be placed outside the technology summation. The system
potential is simply the GW of installed capacity times the number of hours
in the time period. The energy generated by the system is the peak
demand, in GW, of the system, times the number of hours in the time
period, multiplied by the load factor of the system. The time period is
constant to both terms and can be removed. We can then say
GWHs-pot (GWsys) * T
GWHsys 
-[(GWpk) * LF *T]
(1 + RM)
LF
where GWsys is the installed capacity of the system,
GWpk is the peak demand of the system,
RM is the reserve margin of the system,
and LF is the load factor of the system.
The (GWsys / GWpk ) ratio is equivalent to 1 + RM, where RM is
the reserve margin of the system, or the fraction of the system capacity
which is in excess of peak demand. The load factor is a measure of the
time spent at various levels of demand, relative to the peak demand. In
other words, if much of the system operation is spent satisfying near peak
demand, the load factor will be close to one. If relatively little time is
spent at a peak which is significantly different from minimum demand
(base load), the load factor will be smaller.
To illustrate this concept, the load duration curve for the Northeast
region of the U§ is shown in Figure 3-4. The vertical axis is the level of
system demand, normalized to one. The horizontal axis represents the
probability (or percentage of the total time period) that the demand will
exceed a given level. As the curve illustrates, the probability is 100% that
the demand will exceed a certain minimum level (the baseload). The
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probability decreases with increasing demand until the maximum level of
system demand, the peak, is reached. There is zero probability of demand
exceeding the peak. The area under the normalized load duration curve is
the load factor, LF.
Let us now return to the technology capacity factor term, (GWHi /
GWHi-pot). The amount of energy generated from a particular technology,
GWHi, depends on several factors. In electric utility systems similar to
those of the US, the system is operated primarily according to economic
dispatch rules. That is, those technologies with the lowest marginal costs
are dispatched first. As demand grows, more expensive technologies are
dispatched until the point where no additional capacity is available or
allowing demand to go unserved is less costly.
Those units which operate essentially all of the time that they are
available, satisfying the minimum level of demand which always exists
within the system, are called baseload capacity. Coal and nuclear plants are
among the technologies which are dispatched in this mode, with a capacity
factor of 65% being typical. The next level of demand is met by
intermediate capacity, such as oil or natural gas-fired plants, with a typical
capacity factor of 35%. The final level of demand (except for that which
goes unserved) is met by peak capacity, such as oil or natural gas
combustion turbines. These units typically have a capacity factor of
approximately 10%. The actual value of the capacity factor, however, is
fairly complex, being related primarily to the character of the system load
(i.e., the load duration curve), the character of the capacity mix of the
system, the loading order of the plants in the system (primarily based on
marginal cost), and the availability of various technologies (less than 100%
due to maintenance and unplanned outages).
Several methods are available for the calculation of the expected
energy generation and capacity factor of a unit or technology. One method
is chronology modeling. In this method, the system is simulated, with units
dispatched, and subjected to outages, exactly as would occur in the actual
operation of the system. While this provides accurate results, the method
can be prohibitively time-consuming. A second method, used by some
utility planning models, is through probabilistic production cost analysis.
In depth description of this method is beyond the scope of this discussion.
Note, however, that this method is utilized by the Electric Generation
Expansion Analysis System (EGEAS), the model used in this study for the
analysis of various emissions reduction strategies (See Chapter 4).
A third method, which will be used here, is somewhat less accurate,
but allows for some insights into emissions reduction levers7 7 . In this
method, each unit is derated by its availability. That is, a 400MW unit with
an availability of 90% would be treated as if it were a 360MW unit. Units
are then simply "stacked" under the original load duration curve in order
of marginal cost. The expected energy generation from each unit is then
the area under the load duration curve which is met by the unit - an area
which can be closely approximated by a trapezoid.
We can then state that the energy generated by technology i, in time
period T, is approximated by
GWHi = (1/2) (T) (DGWi) (LDCi-. + LDCi)
77 While this method is useful for illustrating simply which factors affect unit generation, actual unit
generation numbers are too inaccurate for the types of analyses conducted in the primary portion of this
study (See Chapter 5). More sophisticated modeling, such as that used in EGEAS, is necessary.
where
and
Once
technology,
T = time period in hours (8760 hrs for one year),
DGWi = derated capacity of technology i = (AVi) (GWi),
AVi = availability of technology i,
LDCi- 1 = the LDC at the point where unit i is loaded.
we have determined the expected energy generation from the
GWHi, the capacity factor of the technology is then
CFi
where
and
GWHi
= GWHi-pot
(1/2) (T) (DGWi) (LDCi- 1 + LDCi)
(GWi) (T)
(1/2) (AVi) (LDCi-.1 + LDC i)
LDCi = LDC( Y (DGWi / DGWsys)),
05 AVi < 1,
0 < LDCi-.1 1,
0 5 LDCi- 1 < LDCi.
We will define a new variable, Pi, to represent an estimate of the
probability that technology i will be in use at any particular time, or,
equivalently, the fraction of the time period in which technology i is
utilized. This value will be calculated as the median value of the portion of
the LDC fulfilled by technology i:
Pi = (1/2) [LDCi-.1 + LDCi]
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The capacity factor is then:
CFi = (AVi) (Pi)
As mentioned previously, in a typical electric power system, the
ordering of technologies is determined primarily by marginal cost.
Marginal cost is a function of the variable operating costs, consumables
costs, and fuel costs (all in expressed in cost/ unit of energy, i.e. $/GWH or
C/KWH ). In this way, the operating costs of the system are minimized.
This ordering may be expressed as the following constraint:
MCi < MCi+ 1
There are some exceptions to this ordering caused by special types of
units. The first exceptions are must-run units. If a technology must be run
whenever available, regardless of marginal cost (as is the case with
cogeneration units for example), the technology is loaded first. That is if
N must-run technologies exist in the system, they will be identified as
technology 0 through N-1.
The second exception is limited generation units. If an energy
limitation causes a unit to be used less than would otherwise 'e desirable
given its marginal cost, it is clear that the unit should be used to its full
limitation. In this case the expected energy generation from the technology
will be exactly equal to the energy limit. The position of the technology
within the loading order is determined by finding that position under the
load duration curve where a trapezoid with a width equal to the derated
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capacity of the energy-limited technology and an area equal to the energy
limitation fits exactly. This is approximately equivalent to the following
constraint:
Energy Limit
i = (DGWi)
In the case of an energy-limited technology where the energy
limitation is not binding, the technology is loaded similarly to typical
technologies - by marginal cost.
Non-dispatchable technologies (NDTs), units whose energy genera-
tion is not controlled by the utility, are a third, and more complex, excep-
tion. Solar power is an example of such a technology. The unit generates
energy only when the sun is shining - an uncontrollable event. NDT
generation can be characterized, however, over a long period of time. In
this case, the energy generated from these technologies may be considered
to be an alteration of demand. When the technology is generating energy,
the demand faced by other technologies is reduced. When taken over the
entire time period, this is simply a modification of the load duration curve.
Note that in this formulation, demand-side management (any effort to alter
the demand seen by the utility supply) can also be considered a non-
dispatchable supply technology. This is particularly useful for comparing
the environmental effects of conservation, peak-shaving, and other
demand-side programs directly with supply alternatives.
The final exceptions are storage technologies. Storage units
presently represent only a small portion of electric power system capacity.
Their use will become increasingly important, however, as the use of non-
dispatchable, non-fossil technologies becomes more important. The ability
to have the energy generated from these units when it is most needed would
greatly assist NDTs in gaining economic feasibility. When determining the
use of storage systems, two factors must be considered - charging and
discharging. The charging problem - how much energy will be stored
and when - is similar to that of a non-dispatchable technology. Energy
will be stored when excess energy is available up to some easily determined
limit. Because of this, the charging side of an energy storage technology
can also be treated as an alteration to the load duration curve. The
discharging aspect of the problem is similar to that of a limited-energy
technology. This aspect is then treated in the same manner.
Finally, note that the primary ordering of technologies according to
marginal cost is merely a function of the desire to minimize costs. The
ordering of the units can be according to any other measurable criterion
and all of the above observations will still apply. One example of such a
criterion would marginal emissions, where units with the lowest emissions
of some pollutant per unit of energy would be dispatched first. This would
minimize the emissions from the system, given its capacity mix and
demand, but would also raise costs.
Potential for End-Use Technology
Let us now turn our attention temporarily away from the supply side
to the demand side - the end use of electricity. We can again return to the
original pollution equation, this time examining all of the activities -
energy services (such as lighting or refrigeration) - for which electricity
is used. Clearly, once again, we have a summation as follows:
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C GWHC = WHsys ( ESk) (ESk)
k=l
where C / GWHsys is the MCEsys term we examined previously,
P is the total number of distinct energy services,
GWH/ESk is the electricity used per unit of energy service k,
and ESk is the total amount of energy service k.
The individual ESk terms might signify units of lighting,
refrigeration, or space heating, for example. ESk can be disaggregated
into:
ESk GNP
ESk = (GNP) -Population) (Population)
or simply,
ESk
ESk = ()Population (Population)Population
This is typical point of departure for many conservation advocates
who feel that the economy, or at least people, can "get by" with lower
amounts of energy services. This may or may not be true, but has given
the word "consdrvation" the connotation of "heating living spaces below the
comfort level"78 or, more generally, "curtailment imposed by the rich
upon the poor"79. The argument about how much energy society really
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78 Lee, etal., 1989.
79 Rose, 1983.
needs is the focus of many of the emerging "environmental ethic"
arguments outlined in the opening chapter80. The validity or invalidity of
these arguments aside, we can see that reduction of energy use without
reduction in energy service is another theoretical method of conservation
(lowering of the GWH / ESk terms). Indeed, many have pointed out the
vast opportunities for progress in this area8 l .
The Complete Equation
We can now state the fully disaggregated equation for the carbon
emissions due to the use of electric power in a single geographic region:
(I+RM) N Cem C GW)i P GWH
C (LF) )i(MMB )i(HRi)(AVi)(Pi)(GWsys) ESk (ESk)
= 1=1
or, equivalently:
1 N Ce C GWHC = (GWpk)(LF) )i(MM B  )i(HRi)(AVi)(Pi)(GWi) I ( ESk )(ESk)(GWpk)(LF) k==1NTMBTU 1
Implied Policy Levers
Now we can examine each term, outlining the potential policy levers
which each prdvides. Since most policy actions directed at altering one
term will have an effect on one or more other terms, these interactions,
and their implications for the effectiveness of policy actions will be a
80 McKibben, 1989, for instance.
81 Lovins, etal., 1982; Goldemberg, etal., 1987.
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primary area of focus. Qualitative judgments will then be made about
policy options which appear most attractive and are worth further study.
Carbon Throughput
There is very little opportunity for action to affect this term. For
most fossil fuel combustion technologies, this term is essentially equal to
unity. There are a few possible exceptions:
Carbon Dioxide Scrubbers
Several policy analysts have suggested the possibility of removing
carbon dioxide from flue gases, a concept similar to that represented by
sulfur scrubbers presently in use. There are several difficulties. First, the
efficiency of the most attractive proposed technology for 100% C02
removal - air separation / flue gas recycle - is approximately 25% in
comparison to 35% for non-scrubbed plants. The increase in cost of
electricity generation associated with the retrofitting of a coal plant with a
C02 scrubber is approximately 80%. The second problem is with the
disposal of C02. The primary alternative for C02 disposal is deep ocean
sequestering. For coastal power plants, the cost of such an operation is
estimated to add an additional 20% to the cost of electricity generation.
The costs would be substantially higher for inland plants. Additionally, the
environmental impact of large scale efforts to sequester C02 in the oceans
is unknown, although likely to be significant. The development of the
technology and an understanding of its impacts are several years away82.
82 Golomb, etal., 1989.
Clearly, the technology holds some promise, but not as a transitional
strategy.
Incomplete Combustion
While incomplete combustion does decrease the percentage of fuel-
based carbon which is released, efficiency decreases, requiring the burning
of more fuel., completely offsetting the original effect and at higher cost.
There is no opportunity for emissions decreases here.
Limestone-Based Sulfur Scrubbers
Other effects on this term can come from the use of limestone-based
S02 scrubbers. Since C02 is released from the limestone (CaCO3) in the
scrubbing process 83, the carbon throughput term is actually greater than
unity for coal plants with scrubbers. This effect, in combination with the
decreased efficiency of plants with FGD systems, leads to an increase in
marginal carbon emissions of approximately 10% over coal plants without
scrubbers.
Carbon Content
As discussed previously, Carbon/MMBTU is highest in coal,
decreasing as one moves from coal to oil and to gas, reaching zero with
some non-fossil technologies such as nuclear and hot dry rock geothermal.
To take advantage of this fact, the usage of low emission fuels must actually
displace the usage of higher emission fuels. This implies a need for high
83 The overall reactions in conventional FGD processes are as follows:
CaCO3(s) + S02(g) + 1/2 H20 -> CaSO3 * 1/2 H20(s) + CO2(g)
CaCO3(s) + SO02(g) + 2 H20 + 1/2 02 -> CaSO4 * 2 H20(s) + CO2(g)
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capacities of technology which use the low emission fuel (GWi) and a high
probability of usage (Pi). These terms are discussed below.
Heat Rate
By lowering heat rate (increasing conversion efficiency), emissions
can be reduced. The most promising technology for this purpose is the
combustion turbine - combined cycle. Versions of the technology exist for
all fossil fuels, and result in substantial efficiency gains over conventional
steam plants alone. The construction costs of such units are low enough
that these units appear attractive independent of emissions considerations.
The increased use of these technologies represents one of the "no-cost" al-
ternatives for emissions reduction. Additional opportunities for efficiency
gains, particularly in natural gas use, are embodied in steam-injection and
fuel cell technologies. These technologies are less economically attractive
than combined cycles, however.
There are, of course, policies which might decrease efficiency,
causing increases in carbon emissions. The retrofitting of coal plants with
sulfur scrubbers is one example. Decreases in efficiency, either through
required scrubber retrofits or aging of plants, can have one counter-
intuitive effect. If the decreases in efficiency are so great as to causes a
plant to become uneconomical, it might be retired and replaced by a new
unit with lower emissions than others in the system. One purpose of the
study is to determine the possible emissions reductions which can be
achieved through switches among technology and fuels. Therefore, the
efficiency and carbon content factors will be fundamental considerations in
the selection of policy options for modeling. Of particular interest were
the potential effects of nuclear, integrated coal gasification / combined-
cycle, and natural gas-fired technologies.
Availability
The only policy lever offered by the availability term is the
possibility of limiting generation from high emissions technologies through
policy-forced outages. By allowing the technology to operate only for a
certain portion of the year, other technologies, presumably with lower
emissions, must be utilized. It should be noted, however, that plants de-
crease in availability over time as forced outages increase. This effect, in
combination with increasing heat rates, is the normal driver for the
retirement of older less efficient plants.
Probability of Usage
As previously stated, the Pi term is the most complex. It is also,
however, the most interesting, in that it provides a number of policy levers
for emissions reduction. These are outlined below, with attention first
placed on supply-side policies, followed by demand-side alternatives.
Supplv-Side Policy Options
Changes in Dispatch Order
There are several potential policies for altering the dispatch order of
the system. The first of these is to hardwire the dispatch, simply defining
the order in which plants will be operated, presumably according to some
complex weighting of costs, environmental emissions, and other factors.
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This would be very difficult in practice, since the order would have to be
redefined for every change in the capacity mix and since the criteria for
ordering are unclear.
The second alternative is to change the criterion for unit dispatch
from marginal costs to some other easily defined and measured criterion.
Among the other possible criteria are marginal carbon emissions, which
would minimize the carbon emissions at greater cost, or marginal SO2
emissions, which would minimize S02 at increased cost, with a probable
decrease in carbon emissions. The carbon dispatch option was one of the
policies examined in the modeling portion of the study.
A third alternative is to maintain the marginal cost dispatch
criterion, but to intemalize other factors, such as carbon emissions, into the
costs. This is done through taxes (based on carbon content of fuels, for
example) or subsidies (i.e., to increase the use of renewable resources).
The advantage to this option is that there is no need for reprogramming of
dispatch centers, since they operate in the same manner as before.
Emissions decrease because there are economic benefits associated with
lowering them. A carbon tax strategy was among the policy strategies
examined in the modeling portion of the study.
A fourth option takes advantage of the system's present capability to
handle limited energy units. In this strategy, energy limits are placed on
high-emission plants. This limits the emissions from these plants to a
certain level, forcing additional generation to come from lower-emission
(and higher cost) technologies. A related strategy is a system-wide cap on
carbon emissions (a "bubble"-type regulation) which treats an aggregated
group of high-emission plants as a single energy-limited technology, again
requiring the use of lower emissions plants when the energy or emissions
cap is reached.
The final option in this category, involves the capability of the
system to define certain units as must-run plants. If low emission plants
which would otherwise receive limited use (because of higher marginal
cost) were defined as must-run units, generation from higher emission
baseload plants would be automatically displaced.
All of these strategies are limited by one constraint: the ability of
low emissions technologies to operate at significantly higher levels of
energy generation. Clearly, a natural gas combustion turbine can not be
expected to run continuously at baseload. Similarly, while a natural gas-
fired combined cycle unit can run at baseload, fuel may not be available in
as large a supply as needed. With both natural gas and oil, there are
probably limits to the amount of fuel which can be obtained by utilities and
on the amount of these fuels on which the utilities should be dependent.
Changes in Capacity Mix
The most straightforward way to alter the capacity mix of a system
is to construct new power plants. New construction is normally driven by
load growth, with new power plants coming on line as demand increases.
Construction can also be driven by economic gains which are recognized
by substantially increased efficiency from new plantS84. While this has
traditionally not been pursued by U.S. utilities, several studies85, including
this one, have shown that some technologies (particularly natural gas fired-
combined cycle) have efficiency gains which offset the cost of construction.
84 These economic gains are more pronounced with high fuel prices which increase the importance of
efficient fuel conversion.
85 Connors, et.al., 1989.
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Finally, of course, construction can be mandated or subsidized as a matter
of policy regardless of growth.
The construction of new low-emission capacity will generally have
one of two effects on environmental emissions. If the technology also has
low marginal costs (nuclear, for example), then marginal emissions will
decrease substantially, since high-emission baseload has been displaced. If
the technology has high marginal costs (natural gas combustion turbines)
the effect on marginal emissions will be minimal, because only peak
generation (generally a small amount of low emission generation) will be
displaced. Higher carbon emission capacity (i.e., coal plants with FGD)
will cause increase in marginal emissions in the same manner. If the new
construction has been driven by increased demand, overall system emis-
sions may or may not increase in spite of the system's decreased marginal
emissions.
The final way that capacity mix can be altered is through the
retirement of existing capacity. This is normally driven by economics,
retiring plants when increasing heat rates and forced outages have made
them uneconomical. Retirement might also be forced by regulation. This
can be done directly, by mandating the retirement of certain types or ages
of plants, or indirectly by tightening environmental regulations so that
retirement of high-emissions capacity is forced. One of the policy
strategies exanrined in the modeling portion of the study examined the
effects of early retirement of coal-fired capacity.
Construction of Non-dispatchable Technologies
Non-dispatchable technologies (NDTs) are those technologies whose
energy generation is controlled by factors external to the utility system,
and whose marginal emissions are typically zero. Solar and wind systems
are examples of such technologies. This characteristic causes these tech-
nologies to have fundamentally different effects than more traditional
supply options. The construction of non-dispatchable capacity is a supply
side option which essentially has demand-side effects. In other words, non-
dispatchable technologies alter the character of the demand faced by the
other supply technologies in the system. The effect of various non-
dispatchable options depends greatly on the character of the electric
generation they produce, as well as the character of the remaining capacity
mix.
The effect of NDTs is generally difficult to predict. For instance,
solar insolation, wind velocity, or river flow can typically be expected to
have certain characteristics (seasonal variations, for example), but the
hour-to-hour generation of the technologies is generally unknown. In
general, however, the construction of NDTs will result in the displacement
of the need for generation at the margin of the system - the highest cost
generation. Since this is, generally, also generation with low emissions, the
environmental effects of the first NDT units added to the system may be
minimal. This is similar to the effects of conservation discussed below.
The primary difference, is that if NDT construction is significantly larger,
it may begin to reduce the need for generation from intermediate and
baseload units which tend to have high emissions. Environmental effects
could then be substantial.
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Demand-Side Policy Options
Conservation
For the purposes of this discussion, we will define conservation to be
the lowering of peak demand while maintaining load factor at an approxi-
mately constant level. It is clear that this type of effort would result in a
lowering of emissions from a given system, since by definition less energy
must be generated from the system as a whole, therefore generating fewer
emissions. There are some counterintuitive effects of conservation, how-
ever. First, if no change in loading order occurs, the energy displaced is
energy from the top of the loading order. These plants are generally low
emissions plants. If the system is being operated according to marginal
costs, a GWH saved through conservation does not displace a GWH from a
coal plant, but rather a GWH from a peaking plant - oil or natural gas.
This means that the carbon emissions reduction will be minimal and the
sulfur dioxide reduction will be negligible due to the dominance of
emissions from coal baseload. Second, it is the inverse of conservation -
load growth - which acts as the natural driver for changes in capacity
mix. In the absence of policies to alter capacity mix, conservation
programs can lead to higher emissions than what might have otherwise
occurred if low emissions technologies been constructed. This is seen in
the modeling portion of this study. Conservation was not modeled
explicitly as a planning alternative, but rather various potential load growth
futures were modeled to examine the effects of changes in load growth on
system costs and emissions.
Peak Clipoing
Peak clipping consists of demand side efforts to reduce the level of
peak demand. The motivation for this is economic. If the peak is smaller,
then the highest marginal cost units will not be operated. This reduces
emissions, but only from the peaking technologies which are generally
minimal contributors to system emissions.
Valley Filling
This policy consists of efforts to increase demand during off-peak
time periods. This can be advantageous economically if the right circum-
stances hold true - specifically, if long-run marginal cost is less than the
average electricity price - because it lowers the average cost of elec-
tricity. This leads directly to an increase in emissions, since the capacity
requirements for baseload become greater. The increased emissions come
from the increased use of intermediate load capacity, which can vary from
inefficient coal capacity (high marginal emissions) to natural gas-fired
combined cycles (low marginal emissions) depending on the characteristics
of the system.
Load Shifting
Load shifting consists of efforts to shift demand from peak hours to
off-peak hours - a combination of peak clipping and valley filling.
Assuming again a marginal cost dispatch, this reduces costs and has an
indeterminate effect on emissions. Essentially energy generation from
peak capacity is displaced exactly by energy generation from intermediate
capacity. The emissions can go in either direction depending on the
technologies involved. A shift from gas-fired combustion turbines to oil-
fired combustion turbines would increase emissions. A shift from gas-
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fired combustion turbines to gas-fired combined cycles would cause a
decrease in emissions.
Flexible Load
The final type of demand-side management consists of efforts to gain
control of the load shape through such activities as contracts with
customers to reduce the quality of electricity services - i.e., through
interruptions of supply - in exchange for certain incentives. Obviously,
the effect of such efforts depends on many factors. Once again, however,
such efforts are most likely to affect the amount of peak generation, which
generally consists of low emissions technologies.
Technology Capacity
Clearly, the level of emissions of a technology is directly related to
the amount of capacity of that technology which is available for generation.
The interaction between this factor and the Pi factor can not be
underemphasized. If, due to high costs of a technology relative to the rest
of the system capacity or other factors, the Pi term is low - that is, if the
technology is a peaking technology - even a high level of capacity will not
contribute greatly to system emissions. If there is little capacity of a
technology, it will have little effect on system emissions even if operated at
baseload (Pi =1). Once again it will be noted that the traditional driver for
changes in this term are demand growth and retirement of existing
capacity. Some additional change might be motivated by economic
incentives or by regulation.
End-Use Efficiency
This is probably the greatest target for conservation (the counter-
vailing effects of which were discussed earlier) and certainly the most
socially feasible. Many energy services can be fulfilled by existing tech-
nologies which are substantially more efficient than present technologies in
widespread use. Among these are high efficiency light bulbs (each bulb
uses 75% less energy than an equivalent incandescent bulb) and high effi-
ciency electric motors (each motor saves 50% over conventional counter-
parts). These are substantial effects since lighting accounts for over 25%
of U.S. electricity demand and motors for approximately 50%86 . The
methods for implementing these technologies, and the costs of such pro-
grams, are a matter of great controversy. Additionally, energy efficient
appliances do not necessarily lead to less energy use. For instance, the ef-
ficiency of office equipment - copying machines, computers, printers -
has increased dramatically, but so has the total number of these machines.
The total demand for these services has actually increased with the effi-
ciency improvements 87. In any case, the implications for environmental
emissions are exactly as discussed in the Conservation section above.
Total Electricity Services
Finally, the amount of each energy service and the number of energy
services actually needed by a society are the subject of many heated
philosophical debates. Only two observations will be made here. First,
past trends have shown an increase both in the quantity and kind of
86 Lovins, etal., 1982; Goldemberg, eLal., 1987.
87 Norford, et.al., 1989.
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electrical services needed. For example, one emerging electrical service -
the electric car - designed to decrease emissions and energy use in the
transportation sector, may substantially increase demand for electricity,
and thus environmental emissions from the electric power sector. Second,
the emerging environmental ethic discussed in Chapter 1 indicates the
possibility that such trends might be reversed, although an evaluation of
changes in this factor is beyond the scope of this study.
77
Chapter Four - Methodology of Study
Rationale
As discussed in Chapter 2, much of the previous study of the
energy/C02 interaction has been based on models of global energy use and
climate, typically focussing on time scales of a century or more. The
desirability of this approach is clear. Predicted climate changes may not be
noticeable for many years. The effects of actions we have taken in the past,
and are taking now, will not be felt for many years due to time lags in the
involved systems. Finally, contributions to the problem come from
everywhere on the globe, and the character of those contributions is
changing with time. The desire to attack the whole problem, with the
rationale that no single part of the problem is big enough to make a
difference, is compelling. The presence of easily accessible models with
which to study the problem in this manner88 have made the likelihood of
doing so even greater. This is evidenced by the many studies which these
models have spawned 89.
But while these studies provide a strong sense of the scale of the
problems, and the general trends of possible solutions, they lack several
key elements, as discussed in Chapter 2. The present study attacks the
problem in a different manner. It is assumed that at some time beyond the
reasonably predictable horizon, perhaps twenty to thirty years, some of the
now-proposed advanced electricity generation technologies may be avail-
able for widespread use. Among these may be such things as fusion, solar
88 Edmonds and Reilly, 1985b; Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983.
89 See Chapter 2.
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power from satellites, extensive hydrogen storage of solar power, off-
shore nuclear fission, or off-shore coal and biomass gasification. The
near-term development of any of these technologies is not assumed,
however. Given the time lags associated with the global C02 problem, it
may be very important to reduce emissions in the intermediate period,
particularly in those regions of the world which are dominant contributors
to CO 2 emissions. Such reductions will only come about through altered
use of existing and near-term technologies.
One drawback to many studies of the electric utility industry,
particularly academic studies, is an appreciation of how electric power
systems actually operate and change over time. This is reflected through
the use of models and/or data which either do not reflect the physical
realities of power system operation or are abstract enough that they appear
not to do so. The large scale global models which aggregate system
operation into a few parameters are clear examples of this. For instance,
the Edmonds & Reilly model, which has been used as a basis for many
studies including some at the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of Energy, assumes that the electricity generation stock is
turned over - completely replaced - every twenty-five years. Another
EPA model, the utility CO2 emission model (UCEM), assumes that all new
capacity is operated to its maximum potential, with remaining demand met
by conventiona coal technology 90. Neither of these models captures the
complexities which determine how new technology actually penetrates the
system and coexists with existing capacity. We have seen that these are
important factors in determining both emissions and costs of various
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policies. Whether these models actually represent accurate simulations of
the U.S. electric power system is irrelevant. They are not perceived to do
so by the very people to whom they might be useful - utility planners.
Because utility planners understand the way power systems work, they
recognize the leaps of faith which are made in these models, and are
subsequently suspicious of any conclusions which might be drawn from its
use. The same comments are relevant for the data used in such studies. If
utility planners can not confirm that the data used in an external study is an
accurate reflection of the realities of the system, any conclusions drawn
from the use of that data are inherently suspect and unlikely to be heeded.
For this study, a model and data base have been selected based on the
electric power industry's past acceptance of their use for this type of study.
The model used is the Electric Generation Expansion Analysis System
(EGEAS), developed for the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in
the early 1980s. The primary data on existing power systems were taken
from the EPRI Regional Utilities Database, a set of synthetic utility
databases developed for large-scale regional studies of the US power
system. EPRI's Technology Assessment Guide was the primary source of
data on technological alternatives for electricity supply expansion as well as
for most of the primary modeling assumptions. All other data were taken
from additional EPRI sources, except where noted.
EGEAS
The model used for the study was version 4.0 of the Electric
Generation Expansion Analysis System (EGEAS), a model developed for
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EPRI by researchers at MIT 91. The user provides the model with
information about the plants in an electric power system and potential
alternatives for future capacity expansion. Among the data provided are
size of plant, age of plant, performance data (heat rates, forced outages,
etc.), capital costs, operating costs, fuel use, environmental characteristics,
and financial data. Additional data concerning the general system, such as
fuel prices and inflation rates, are also provided. Most of the data can be
defined to vary over time. EGEAS can then be used to determine optimal
plans for future capacity expansion and to simulate the system operation
for some time in the future (using expansion plans defined by the user or
generated internally). The system simulation provides the user with
trajectories of such data as costs (capital cost outlays, production costs,
etc.), fuel usage, and environmental emissions. These outputs are reason-
ably accurate due to the sophisticated probabilistic production costing
algorithm used by EGEAS. This algorithm allows for the inclusion of
many power system subtleties (limited energy units, storage units, and
scheduled maintenance, for instance) without the prohibitive computational
time requirements of chronological models. The model was run on a
MicroVAX 3400.
EPRI Regional Systems Database
Version 3.0 of the EPRI Regional Systems (ERS) Database was used
to provide the existing plant data for the study92. ERS is a set of six syn-
thetic databases, each representing a region of the U.S., which accurately
91 EPRI, 1982a.
92 EPRI, 1989h.
reflect the characteristics of the power systems within those regions. The
regional divisions are illustrated in Figure 4-1. The databases are
considered "synthetic" since they do not provide data for every existing
generator, but instead provide scaled-down versions of the actual systems.
Whereas each of the defined regions has an electric generating capacity on
the order of 100 GW, each region of the synthetic database has a capacity
of approximately 20 GW. The units in the scaled-down system have been
chosen to accurately reflect the capacity mix and the performance
characteristics of the actual units in the system. Because of this, the data of
primary concern in this study - costs, environmental emissions, fuel use
- are proportional to those which would be obtained in a full-scale
simulation. Issues which depend on geography or system size -
transmission requirements, environmental deposition, fuel transportation
- can not be dealt with accurately through the use of the ERS, but are of
secondary importance to the study. Environmental data, not provided in
the ERS, were obtained from EPRI technology-specific assessment
reports 93 and from generic emissions estimates calculated by the
Environmental Protection Agency94.
Technology Assessment Guide
Information concerning technology alternatives for future expansion
was obtained fiom the EPRI's Technology Assessment Guide (TAG) 95.
The TAG is a set of consistent data concerning the actual or estimated costs
and performance characteristics of various existing and near-term
93 EPRI - Numerous reports listed in references section.
94 US EPA, 1985.
95 EPRI, 1989f.
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EPRI (and NERC) Regions
Figure 4-1
Source: EPRI, The EPRI Reaional Systems Database, 1989d.
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technological alternatives for future electricity generation. These
alternatives - consisting of various coal, oil, gas, nuclear, and renewable
technologies - were used directly in EGEAS as planning alternatives for
the expansion optimization modes. The TAG was also used as the primary
source of information about various fuels, including chemical composition,
heating value, and region-specific price. Additional information about
fuels was obtained from various EPRI reports, the Industrial and Marine
Fuels Reference Book 96, and the Standard Handbook for Mechanical
Engineers97. Some environmental data were provided in the TAG. Addi-
tional data were again obtained from EPRI technology-specific assessment
reports and the EPA. As this data is intended to be consistent with the
ERS, regional differences were accounted for in the TAG.
Re2ions Considered
For this study, two regions were examined: the Northeast and the
East Central. The Northeast consists of New England, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, eastern Maryland, and eastern Pennsylvania. The East
Central regions contains Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, lower
Michigan, western Pennsylvania, western Maryland, and western Virginia.
See Figurm 4-1.
T ons were chosen because of their vastly different character-
istics. heast is characterized by a diverse generating mix, large
power purchases, extensive cogeneration, fairly high reliability, and fairly
high electricity costs caused by poor access to low cost fuels. The East
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96 Clark, G.H., 1988.
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Central is characterized by its coal-dominated capacity mix, high reserve
margin, and fairly low cost electricity due to its proximity to low-cost coal.
The distribution of electricity generation and carbon emissions across the
various US regions is shown in Figures 4-2 and 4-3. The effect of
differences in capacity mix is clear. While the two regions generate
essentially the same level of energy, the East Central region has signifi-
cantly larger carbon emissions 98. The regions are also of interest in this
study due to the political tension between the two which has been caused by
the allegations of environmental damage in one (acid deposition in the
Northeast) caused by air emissions in the other (Sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide emissions from the East Central). The Northeast region
was studied first to allow for qualitative comparisons with similar and
more detailed MIT studies of New England 99. Additional qualitative
observations will be made with reference to a third region, the West. This
region is of interest because of the greater opportunities for renewable-
based generation from such technologies as solar, wind, and geothermal.
Technologies Considered
Only near-term technologies were considered. That is, all of these
technologies are either available or expected to be available, without large
technical t~eakthroughs, in the next 15 years or so - most of them within
the next five ydars. For the regions considered, these technologies were
limited exclusively to fossil fuel, nuclear, and municipal solid waste
98 It should be noted that these figures represent electricity generation (and emissions from that generation)
within a region, regardless of where that electricity is used. Since the Northeast region has significant
power purchases, some from the East Central region, this comparison is somewhat biased.
Connors, et.al., 1989.
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alternatives. Other renewable-based technologies, such as solar, wind, and
geothermal, were not included because of EPRI assessments that these
technologies are only feasible within the West region 00oo.
Among the coal technologies considered were the following:
1) Conventional Pulverized Coal with Wet Limestone
Flue Gas Desulfurization (Sulfur Scrubbers): Several versions
of this technology were considered, including different sizes as
well as subcritical and supercritical units. Regional differ-
ences, caused mainly by the availability of different coal types
were also considered.
2) Conventional Pulverized Coal with Spray Dryer
F.D": These units are fired on low-sulfur coals and use
different scrubber technology.
3) Conventional Pulverized Coal with Regenerable
FGD": This technology is for high-sulfur coal and has 90%
S02 removal.
4) Advanced Pulverized Coal - State of the Art Power
Plan: This plant represents the inclusion of all conceivable and
immediately available technological improvements for coal
combustion, still using the conventional pulverized coal pro-
cess, with advanced flue gas desulfurization.
100 While clearly the feasibility of several of these technologies is more limited and longer term in other
regions, their complete exclusion is not inherently necessary.
5) Atmospheric Fluidized Bed Combustion (AFBC):
This technology is one of the prime candidates for "clean coal"
combustion. S02 and NOx emissions are reduced, because
they are removed in the combustion chamber instead of from
flue gases. Several versions of this technology were con-
sidered, including bubbling bed and circulating bed (differen-
tiated primarily by the rate of air flow through the combustion
chamber) and various coal feedstocks (bituminous, sub-
bituminous, and lignite).
6) Pressurized Fluidized Bed Combustion (PFBC): This
technology is similar to AFBC, but operates above atmo-
spheric pressures. In general, PFBC is more efficient than
AFBC, but the technology is several years behind in develop-
ment. The variations of PFBC which were considered were
turbocharged boilers (bubbling bed and circulating bed) and
combined cycles.
7) Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC):
This technology is the other prime "clean coal" candidate. In
this process, coal is gasified and the gas is used to fire a gas
turbine - combined cycle unit. By utilizing "waste streams"
(of steam, for example) from various stages of the process as
inputs for other stages, the units can achieve high efficiencies.
Additionally, SO2 and NOx emissions are very low. The
technology was considered in various sizes and for various
coal feedstocks.
The liquid and gas-fueled technologies which were considered
included the following:
1) Combustion Turbine (CT): This technology, fired on
either distillate oil or natural gas, is well established as an
inexpensive technology for the fulfillment of peak demand.
Among the versions considered were oil and gas fired units,
conventional and advanced units, and various sizes.
2) Steam-Injected Gas Turbine (STIG): In this
technology, steam from the gas turbine is reinjected into the
turbine in order to increase efficiency. The units are only
marginally economical at this time.
3) Combustion Turbine - Combined Cycle (GTCC):
This technology is a combination of a conventional combustion
turbine, fired on distillate oil or natural gas, with the addition
of a steam bottoming cycle. The bottoming cycle, uses steam
from the gas turbine to generate additional electricity, thus
gaining a great deal in efficiency over stand-alone gas
turbines. The versions considered included oil-fired and gas-
fired units, as well as conventional and advanced units.
4) Fuel Cells - Fuel cells operate similarly to batteries
with the continual addition of chemical energy from a fuel gas.
Since there is no intermediate conversion of chemical energy
to thermal energy, the efficiency of conversion to electricity
can be very high. Although costs of the technology are high,
the major environmental emissions of the units are lower than
any other fossil fuel-fired technology.
The other technologies considered were the following:
1) Municipal Solid Waste (MSW): This technology is
not particularly attractive economically or environmentally
for the production of electricity, but has the benefit of reduc-
ing the solid waste problem. Two versions of this technology,
mass bum and refuse-derived fuel, were considered.
2) Advanced Light Water Reactor - Evolutionary:
This technology consists of incremental technological im-
provements to conventional light water reactors.
3) Advanced Light Water Reactor - Passive Safety:
This technology is similar to conventional light water re :ctors,
but contains inherent safety features. "Passive safety" implies
that the prevention of core meltdown does not require proper
operation and human management of complex cooling systems,
but is guaranteed by the physical properties of the system.
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4) Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor
(MHTGR): This is another nuclear technology with passive
safety features. The additional benefits of this technology are
its generation of process heat which can be used for industrial
applications and its modular design, which would allow for
streamlined licensing procedures.
Uncertainties Considered
The primary uncertainties considered within the study were fuel
price and load growth. An attempt was made to choose a set of possible
futures which would provide a reasonable resolution with which to view
possible outcomes, without prohibitively increasing computational re-
quirements. It was decided that two fuel price trajectories - base and high
- and four load growth trajectories - base, low, high, and very high -
would be selected for analysis. Each possible combination of these uncer-
tainties - high fuel price and low load growth, for instance -- constituted a
"future". The basic fuel price uncertainty was obtained from DRI
forecasts 01o. A fuel price uncertainty with higher fuel prices for oil and
gas was then created. Significantly higher prices for coal or uranium were
not judged likely enough to be worthy of consideration. The base load
growth cases for each region were taken from the ERS. Although each
varied with time, the projected growth was approximately 1.5% per year
in the Northeast region and approximately 1.0% per year in the East
Central region. Low growth cases were 1% less per year than the base
101 DRI, 1989.
case for each region; high growth cases were 1% higher; very high growth
cases were 3% higher.
Strategies Considered
Various potential strategies for future electric power, some designed
explicitly for the reduction of CO 2 emissions and some designed for other
policy goals, were then defined. Several of these are based on proposed
legislation or policies, while others are based on direct manipulation of the
policy levers identified in Chapter 3. The study undertaken defined seven
basic policy strategies for analysis. These are:
1) Base: The base strategy was defined as a business-as-
usual strategy in which utilities continue to attempt to
minimize costs, within moderate constraints for SO02, NOx,
and particulate emissions. No limits on carbon emissions were
assumed. In this case, nuclear options were not considered,
since extended use of nuclear power will undoubtedly require
a change in at least regulatory environment, if not general
public acceptance.
2) Nuclear: The nuclear strategy differed from the base
in that n'uclear options were offered as the only available
baseload capacity option (new coal-fired options were
removed) in the optimization runs. In the Northeast, the
nuclear option was marginally more economical than the
IGCC option, while marginally less so in the East Central.
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4) No Nuclear / No Coal: In this strategy, the system
was forced to choose only natural gas and oil based
technologies for expansion, thus forcing combined cycle and
combustion turbine technologies.
5) Dispatch Modifier: The optimal expansion pathway
of the Base strategy was used to define the plant additions.
The units were operated according to marginal carbon
emissions instead of marginal cost. While the expansion
pathway in this case was by no measure "optimal", the dispatch
modifier does cause a minimization of carbon emissions, for a
given capacity mix and demand. Note that carbon dispatch is
almost identical to sulfur dispatch, with the exception of "clean
coal" technologies - IGCCs, AFBCs, and conventional coal
with FGD. These technologies have high carbon emissions and
lower sulfur emissions, slightly altering their loading order
positions in the two forms of environmental dispatch. Only
carbon dispatch was modeled; possible differences with sulfur
dispatch will be examined qualitatively.
5) Early Retirement: For all coal plants, the existing
operating life was reduced by 10 years (generally from 50 to
40). This is an attempt to phase out those plants which have
the highest marginal emissions of both CO2 and S02 - older
coal plants. This requires a substantial increase in construc-
tion, particularly in the early years and specifically in the coal
dependent East Central region.
6) Carbon Tax: A substantial tax on the use of fossil
fuels was assumed based on carbon content ($5.70/GJ for coal;
$2.30/GJ for oil; and $1.10/GJ for natural gas)10 2. This is an
attempt to internalize the costs of carbon emissions by tying
economic benefits to the reduction of carbon emissions 103.
7) Conservation: No attempt was made to explicitly
model conservation efforts. For each region, however, four
possible load growth paths were defined and simulated
separately in order to determine what benefits, if any, might
be obtained through switches from high growth futures to low
growth futures.
Optimization Methodology
Each combination of future (a load growth and fuel price
combination) and strategy defined a scenario. It was then necessary to
determine the optimal expansion path, or choice of technology alternatives,
102 These taxes, in 1985S, are the same as those used in several EPA studies. In the EPA studies, the
taxes were phased in over a period from 1985 to 2050. In this formulation, the taxes were implemented
immediately (1989) and are, thus, even more extreme.
103 It should be noted that a carbon tax is likely to induce not only technology and fuel switching as
examined here, but conservation as well, due to steep increases in the price of electricity. The modeling of
the carbon tax here assumes that the same level of demand must be met by this strategy as with the others
(equivalent to assuming a price elasticity of demand of zero) since this demand feedback can not be
explicitly modeled within the framework of EGEAS. The result is that the carbon tax appears more costly
and less effective for emissions reduction than is likely to be the reality.
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for each scenario. EGEAS offers three methods of optimization, all of
which were used at various stages of the analysis:
1) Linear programming: The linear program (LP) is a
simplistic method for roughly screening large numbers of
alternatives. By assuming a constant capacity factor for each
unit (not a strong assumption as discussed in Chapter 3), the
LP selects, from up to thirty alternatives, those alternatives
which are most economical at some level of system demand.
The method overlooks a great deal of the reality of electricity
system operation, and is not useful for the development of
optimal expansion plans or the calculation of costs or
emissions. The LP is useful, however, for pointing out those
technologies which are most likely to be chosen as alternatives
by other optimization methods. Since the computational time
of other methods is directly related to the number of
alternatives which are considered, the LP can serve as a useful
pre-screening tool.
2) Bender's Decomposition: The Bender's decomposi-
tion (BD) method was the primary optimization method used
in this study. The method is essentially a nested linear
program with iterations between a master problem and sub-
problem which allow for much greater accuracy than the LP.
Unit generation is calculated through the use of the Baleriaux
95
production costing algorithm mentioned in Chapter 3104. The
main disadvantage of the BD method is its selection of
fractional units for capacity expansion. This is not a weakness
in this study, however, since the system databases are
synthetic, the goal of the study was not to develop specific
expansion plans (i.e., build one coal plant in 1992 and two gas-
fired units in 1993), but rather to reveal the character of
possible expansion plans. Additionally, the BD method in
EGEAS properly accounts for the planned and forced outages
of units, despite the fractional unit expansion plans, thus not
distorting cost, fuel use, or emissions data. As expected,
system costs are lower when fractional units are allowed than
with solely integral units, simply because the fractional unit
option provides greater flexibility for unit construction.
3) Dynamic programming: The dynamic program (DP)
algorithm is the most accurate of the optimization methods
available within EGEAS. The DP provides expansion plans
with integral units, but is nearly prohibitive in its computa-
tional requirements. As stated above, integral unit capability
is not a feature of interest in this study. The DP was used
primarily, to verify the accuracy of the BD method for a few
scenarios.
104 EPRI, 1982a.
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Simulation Methodology
Once determined by one of the optimization methods, the twenty-five
year expansion path for each scenario was simulated using the prespecified
pathway option of EGEAS. This option provides an accurate yearly
simulation of system operations, providing detailed information about
costs, supply reliability, fuel use, and environmental emissions. The
prespecified pathway can be run utilizing fractional or integral units. For
all scenarios, except those associated with the dispatch modifier, the
fractional unit option was used since the optimal expansion path was
calculated in fractional units. The quirks of the modified dispatch option in
EGEAS require integral unit simulation, so the fractional units of the base
case were rounded to best mimic the fractional expansion plan. As this was
already a simulation of a suboptimal plan, this added inaccuracy (which
tends to increase system costs) is not significant.
Model Output
The EGEAS model provides detailed data about a variety of system
parameters. Cost data includes annual capital costs, operating costs, fuel
costs, and total system costs. Annual environmental emissions are also
calculated. Emissions of interest in this study are the greenhouse gases
carbon dioxide (calculated as elemental carbon - C), methane (CH4), and
nitrous oxide (N20), the acid rain precursors sulfur dioxide (SO 2) and
nitrous oxides (NOx), as well as total suspended particulate (TSP), a local
pollutant. The model also calculates the energy generation, fuel use, and
price for each fuel and technology type. Financial data and individual unit
data are also available, but were not used extensively in this study.
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Chapter Five - Results
Overview
The large number of variables considered within the study leads to
an inherently complex set of results. For each of the two regions, four
possible growth paths, two fuel price trajectories, and six policy strategies
were considered. Thus, 96 scenarios have been modeled. Within each
scenario, nearly forty fuels may have been utilized by more than sixty
supply technologies, with changes in capacity mix, fuel usage and tech-
nology usage over the 25 year time period. The environmental emissions
(six emissions were calculated) and the various system costs (capital,
operating, fuel, etc.), which also vary over time, are of primary interest.
Clearly, a comprehensive listing of all of these data would be tedious and
of limited utility. Lewis Carroll once pointed out that there is nothing
more useless than a map which has been drawn on a one-to-one scale - it
is hoped that this mistake can be avoided here.
To alleviate this problem, the results are given in "cross-sections" of
the multi-dimensional space described above. This is accomplished by sys-
tematically illustrating the changes in one or two variables given constant
values of other variables. For instance, data are given which illustrate
carbon dioxide emissions over time for all six policy strategies, given a
single region, and a single future (one load growth / fuel pri-e combina-
tion). Similarly, all emissions are shown for a single strategy, region, and
future, and so on. A basic set of these cross sections is given, augmented
by those additional cross sections which provide particularly unusual,
salient, or counterintuitive information.
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Expansion Plans
The first variable of interest is technology choice - that is, which
technologies were among those used for future electricity supply? We are
also interested in when, where, and under what circumstances particular
technologies are the most attractive expansion alternatives. The choice of
technology is driven by the relative costs of the various technologies and
the needs of the system. These drivers can vary over time as well as across
regions, futures and policy strategies. In general, capacity expansion
followed similar patterns in all scenarios. Different scenarios resulted
primarily in shifts in the timing of the general expansion pattern.
Differences in technology choice from the basic pattern were caused
primarily by significant shifts in relative fuel prices and when mandated by
policy (i.e., the nuclear strategy).
The general expansion pattern consists of a zero-construction time
period while present overbuilt capacity levels out, followed by the
construction of efficient intermediate / peaking capacity, followed finally
by inexpensive baseload capacity. The most frequently chosen intermediate
technology was the natural gas-fired combined cycle (GTCC). In some
high fuel price scenarios, oil-fired combined cycle units were more
attractive for some portion of the study period. Additionally, in some
scenarios which required only a small amount of peak capacity, at minimal
capital cost, stand alone combustion turbines (gas or oil-fired, depending
on prices) were more attractive than the combined cycles. Two baseload
technologies were similar in economic attractiveness - integrated coal-
gasifier combined cycle (IGCC) and the advanced light water reactor. In
the East Central region the IGCC was marginally more economically
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attractive, while in the Northeast, the situation was reversed. Due to the
greater uncertainties surrounding the assumptions for nuclear reactors, the
IGCC expansion paths were considered to be the "base" strategy.
Additionally, in a few scenarios where high growth and low fuel prices
cause capital and operating cost considerations to outweigh the fuel savings
from greater efficiency in a few years of the study period, conventional
pulverized coal plants with sulfur scrubbers were chosen instead of IGCCs.
Environment-Cost Tradeoffs
The primary focus of this analysis is identifying the extent to which
various strategies can reduce environmental emissions and the associated
costs of implementing these strategies. This formulation implies a desire to
find the most cost-effective strategies - those which give the most "bang
for the buck." We will examine this and similar features through the use
of tradeoff curves. Each tradeoff curve examines the performance of
various strategies with respect to two attributes of interest in the study (i.e.,
cost and C0 2). Each axis will be plotted such that lower values of the
attributes (i.e., low cost and low emissions) are more desirable. This will
allow the reader to visually evaluate the performance of various strategies.
If any strategy is closer to the lower-left corner of the graph than a second
strategy - that is, if the first strategy is better for one attribute without
being worse for the other - the first strategy is said to dominate the
second. Some subset of the strategies will not be dominated by any other
strategy, and thus represent an "optimal set"105. If we were concerned
only with the two attributes depicted, and we were confident of the
105 A Pareto optimal set for the two attributes of interest.
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assumptions which led to the positions of the various strategies, there
would be no reason to choose a strategy outside of the optimal set, since
there would always be one strategy with which we can gain better
performance on one or both of the attributes. Additionally, choices
between strategies within the optimal set can be made with full under-
standing of the associated tradeoffs (i.e., the increased costs of additional
emissions reduction).
Several words of caution should be added. Any particular tradeoff
curve depicts only two attributes, with no regard for others. While our
primary interest is in the tradeoffs between costs and carbon emissions, we
will also examine the tradeoffs between these two attributes and another
important environmental emission: sulfur dioxide. Quite contrary to
conventional wisdom, those strategies which provide for the most
improvement in S02, do not necessarily provide subsequent improvements
in carbon emissions. This helps to demonstrate the complexity of tech-
nology and strategy choice.
There are many other attributes - reliability of electric service,
capacity siting requirements, risk of nuclear accidents, volume of solid
wastes, dependence on foreign energy sources, etc. - which are important,
but for which explicit tradeoffs cannot usefully be illustrated (each
additional attribute would add a dimension to the tradeoff curve, assuming
it could be adequately quantified). These issues are explicitly considered,
however, when discussing the conclusions which might be drawn from a
viewing of the given tradeoff curves in isolation.
Each tradeoff curve is valid only for a certain set of assumptions,
and will change with changes in load growth and fuel prices. Similarly, the
tradeoffs are different for different regions. The most important changes
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which occur with these differing assumptions are illustrated. This helps
identify those assumptions to which strategic planning may be most
sensitive, as well as those strategies which are relatively robust with regard
to uncertainties.
The primary examined are the net present value of total costs (annual
costs discounted to 1988$ by a discount rate of 10%), total carbon
emissions, and total S02 emissions - all totalled over the entire 25 year
study period (1989 - 2013). No discounting is applied to the emissions
numbers 106. To avoid the confusion of three-dimensional presentation,
only tradeoffs between two attributes are presented. For any particular set
of assumptions, the three dimensional tradeoff is represented by the three
explicit tradeoff curves (cost vs. carbon, cost vs. S02, and carbon vs.
SO2)107.
First, we will examine the tradeoffs for the Northeast region under
the base future assumptions (base load growth and base fuel price). These
tradeoffs are shown in Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3. Note again that in all
tradeoffs, a position toward the lower-left corner (approaching zero
emissions or zero cost) is most desirable. Note also that the following
abbreviations are used to represent the strategies: Nuclear - NUC; No
Nuclear / No Coal - NNNC; Early Retirement - ER; Dispatch Modifier -
DM; Carbon Tax - CT.
Of particular interest in the carbon versus cost tradeoff is the nearly
dominant position of the nuclear strategy. The nuclear strategy has lower
carbon emissions at lower cost than all other strategies except the no
106 The discounting of costs is motivated by opportunity costs -- the rate of return which could have been
earned through investment of money elsewhere. No such analog exists for environmental emissions.
107 The three-dimensional tradeoff is fully defined by any two of the three two-dimensional tradeoffs, but
the extrapolation of the third tradeoff requires some avoidable mental gymnastics which detract from the
utility of the tradeoff curve representation.
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nuclear / no coal strategy' 08. The presence of three strategies which
reduce carbon emissions, relative to the base case, at essentially no cost
(nuclear, no nuclear / no coal, and early retirement) supports one of the
primary underlying hypotheses of this study. Finally, in the absence of the
nuclear option (a strong possibility due to other environmental and political
considerations), there exists an optimal set (carbon tax, dispatch modifier,
and no nuclear / no coallo09) where the tradeoffs between carbon emissions
and cost are clear.
The S02 - cost tradeoff, Figure 5-2, shows a small optimal set -
dispatch modifier and early retirement. There is again a group of
strategies which produce different amounts of emissions for essentially the
same cost as the base case. The difference in S02, however, is not as great
as that observed in the carbon emissions tradeoff. This is perhaps most
dramatic with reference to the performance of the nuclear case, which
significantly reduces carbon emissions, but appears to have little effect on
S02. This a result primarily of the role which is played by coal, in
general, and by IGCCs in the base case. As we have seen in Chapter 3,
carbon emissions are driven by the amount of coal-fired generation in the
system. SO2 emissions, however, are driven by the amount of uncontrolled
coal-fired capacity. In the base strategy, most need for future generation
expansion is met by IGCCs. The IGCCs add to the coal-fired generation -
increasing carton emissions - but begin to displace uncontrolled coal
108 It should be noted here that some of the cost numbers are misleading. Higher cost strategies
(particularly the carbon tax and dispatch modifier) would be likely to induce conservation, a negative
feedback on costs not accounted for in this formulation. Additionally, the carbon tax produces a large sum
of money which can presumably be redistributed. Finally, no nuclear / no coal costs may be understated
because of decreased reliability, the costs of which are estimated, but highly uncertain. These factors are
discussed in greater detail in the strategy-specific evaluations below.
109 Given margins of error, particularly appropriate for such a large scale study, the early retirement option
is not clearly excluded.
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generation - reducing SO2 emissions. The nuclear option does decrease
annual levels of both emissions, but the reductions in total SO2 are not
significantly greater than in the base case because a similar amount of
uncontrolled coal capacity remains in place. This is also the reason why
the early retirement option seems to be somewhat more effective.
The tradeoff curve for the two environmental emissions, when costs
are disregarded, reveals a clear optimal set - nuclear, carbon tax, and
dispatch modifier. Also of note are the no nuclear / no coal and early
retirement strategies, which, while not in this optimal set, are both clearly
dominant over the base case. The carbon tax appears to be the most
effective at reducing overall environmental emissions - given similar
levels of concern over both emissions - but its significantly greater costs
have been seen in the other tradeoffs. Finally, when examining the entire
tradeoff set it should be noted that three strategies (nuclear, early
retirement, and no nuclear / no coal) dominate the base case on all three
attributes.
The tradeoffs for the East Central base future, shown in Figures 5-4,
5-5, and 5-6, contain similar patterns, but are qualitatively different in a
few respects. It can first be noted that the carbon - cost tradeoff once again
shows the nuclear strategy to be dominant. Removing the nuclear strategy,
all of the remaining strategies are in the optimal set. It appears that the no
nuclear / no coal strategy and the base strategy are nearly dominated by the
dispatch modifier since their costs are only marginally smaller for
substantial increases in emissions. The scales of the axes are somewhat
misleading, however. The difference in cost between the dispatch
modifier, $43.2(109) and the base case, $38.6(109) is 12% of the base case
costs; the difference in emissions, 695 to 669 million tons, is less than 4%.
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These minimal effects are due to two independent factors. First, the
dependence of the East Central region on coal makes even marginal
emissions reductions costly, since a large amount of new non-coal capacity
is needed. Second, the projected growth rate in this region is smaller than
for the Northeast. This delays the time at which new (less-polluting)
capacity will be needed. Many of the strategies have similar performance
characteristics until new capacity is built. If this is only for a few years in
the study period, the overall effects are smaller.
The effects of uncertainties can also be demonstrated with tradeoff
curves. Returning again to the Northeast region, we can observe some of
the effects of load growth (and its inverse - conservation) by examining
tradeoff curves for various growth assumptions. For example, Figures 5-
7, 5-8, and 5-9 display the carbon - cost tradeoffs for the low (-0.5%),
high (=2.5%), and very high (=4.5%) growth scenarios. In general, the
pattern remains similar to that which was previously observed for the base
growth future. The primary change in the pattern which occurs with
increasing growth is the shift of the early retirement strategy relative to the
other five. In the low growth scenario, the early retirement option appears
very attractive, dominated only by the nuclear case. As growth increases,
however, the attractiveness of the option decreases. In the highest growth
case, the early retirement option is worse on both attributes than even the
base strategy. This indicates the possibility of synergistic effects between
early retirement strategies and conservation. We can also observe that, as
growth increases, the differentiations between the emissions levels of
different strategies become greater - in both absolute and percentage
terms - while the differentiations between costs remain approximately
constant in absolute terms (decreasing as a percentage). Note also that only
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the nuclear strategy has carbon emissions which are fairly insensitive to
load growth.
In the case of S02 emissions, all of the strategies are fairly robust to
load growth. All strategies exhibited changes of less than 12% in total S02
emissions from the low growth future to the very high growth future.
Tradeoffs remained essentially the same.
Time Series Data
The logical extension of the tradeoff curve analysis is a more
detailed comparison across strategies of single attribute performance. This
can be accomplished through the use of time series data for specific
attributes (i.e., carbon emissions) to more closely illustrate the timing and
rates of change for strategy differences which were observed in the
tradeoff curves. Again, each graph is valid only for a single region and
for a single combination of load growth and fuel prices. Data for the base
case future - base growth rate and base fuel prices - will be of primary
interest.
The first attribute of interest is carbon emissions. Figure 5-10
displays the carbon emissions over the study period for the Northeast
region and the base future. The nuclear strategy is the only one which
actually lowers the annual emissions rate by the end of the study period 10o.
The carbon tax holds emissions approximately stable 1 . All strategies are
superior to the base case in all study years. This figure also illustrates that
110 This should not be confused with the "lower" emissions observed in the tradeoff curves. There, a
reduction referred to a lower total amount of emissions than would have been obtained in the base strategy
and did not necessarily indicate a reduction in the annual rate of emissions.
111 This is substantially different from a stabilization of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, which
would require a global reduction in carbon emissions of approximately 50% (EPA, 1989). A stable
emission rate will still lead to increased atmospheric concentrations.
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those strategies which mandate technological choice - nuclear and no
nuclear / no coal - have an effect only when construction with the
mandated technology becomes necessary, typically well into the study
period. This is seen in Figure 5-10 in the branching off of these two
strategies from the base strategy trajectory in the year 2000. Those
strategies which alter the system or its operating rules - dispatch
modifier, early retirement, and carbon tax - have an effect immediately
upon implementation, the first year of the study period in this case. This
implies that certain combinations of the two types of strategies might be
most effective in both reducing emissions early and then sustaining those
reductions as time progresses.
The same graph for the East Central region, shown in Figure 5-11,
provides a similar "ranking" of the various strategies, although again with
differences in degree, consistent with observations made in the tradeoffs.
Again, the nuclear strategy is the only strategy which reduces emissions
below base year levels. While this reduction is not substantial, the rate of
reduction is high in the final years of the study. The carbon tax does not
provide the same stabilization of emissions as was observed in the
Northeast. The same pattern of early year reductions in the system-
oriented strategies and later year reductions in technology-oriented
strategies is observed.
We can also examine the time series data for other emissions. Again,
S02 is of particular interest. The SO2 emissions for the base future in the
Northeast region are displayed in Figure 5-12. The most striking feature
here is that all strategies, including the base strategy, lead to a reduction in
SO2 emissions, primarily due to the presence of the IGCC as the default
technology of choice. The most dramatic reductions are seen in the carbon
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tax and dispatch modifier strategies, as was observed in the tradeoff curves.
Note that while the dispatch modifier has a lower total amount of
emissions, the rate of reduction in the later years of the study is greater
with the carbon tax. Also of interest is the increase in emissions - relative
to the base strategy - observed in the no nuclear / no coal strategy. In the
absence of regulation which forces natural gas fired technologies into the
baseload, additional gas-fired capacity will not displace high emissions
capacity. In fact, the absence of new baseload capacity in this strategy
forces the less efficient - and, thus, more polluting - existing coal
capacity to generate more energy than they are required to produce in the
base strategy. Emissions actually increase with the exclusive addition of
low emissions technology.
Dramatic regional differences are shown in Figure 5-13, which
illustrates the SO2 emissions for the East Central region. Again, all
strategies reduce emissions below their 1989 levels by the end of the study
period, with none ever increasing substantially. The dispatch modifier,
which was so effective in the Northeast, does little here, because there is so
little diversity in the capacity mix. Also the carbon tax, which causes
significant decreases when implemented - the base year - is not
significantly more effective than other strategies at reducing emissions in
later years, because of the incentive to avoid coal technologies, even if they
are "clean coal" technologies. The most effective strategy is the early
retirement strategy, which actually directly removes the most polluting
capacity from the mix.
Several other emissions were tracked in the model. The first of
these was methane (CH4), another greenhouse gas. Methane emissions for
the Northeast are shown in Figure 5-14. Again, the nuclear case is the
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most effective at reducing methane, because it displaces high emissions
capacity with zero emissions capacity. For the other strategies, however,
the methane emissions patterns are virtually inverses of the carbon
emissions patterns seen in Figure 5-10. Strategies with lower carbon
emissions tended to use a significantly larger amount of natural gas
(consisting primarily of methane) - which increases methane emissions
due to incomplete combustion and leaks. Although none of the increases
are very large, this is an important effect because methane is over twenty
times more effective as a greenhouse gas, per molecule, than is C0 2 112. At
these emissions levels, however, it is calculated that positive effects of C02
decreases substantially outweigh the negative increases of CH4 increases.
The other major greenhouse gas from fossil fuel combustion is
nitrous oxide, N20. Nitrous oxide is nearly 200 times more effective as a
greenhouse gas than C02, but its atmospheric levels are relatively small'•3.
Also, fossil fuels are not a primary source of these emissions, as they are
for CO 2 and CH4114. The emissions of N20 for the Northeast are shown
in Figure 5-15. It is seen that N20 emissions almost exactly track CO2
emissions shown in Figure 5-10. Policies for the reduction of C02 appear
to have similar desirable effects on nitrous oxide.
Two other non-greenhouse emissions were calculated - nitrogen
oxides (NOx), an acid rain precursor, and total suspended particulate
(TSP), a local pollutant. The NOx emissions for the Northeast are shown
in Figure 5-16. NOx emissions are reduced by all strategies, but less in the
112 Dickinson and Cicerone, 1986a; Ramanathan, etal., 1985; Wang and Molnar, 1985.
113 Ibid.
114 The processes by which N20 is produced in fossil fuel combustion is not well understood. Emissions
here are based on very uncertain assumptions. Hill, et.al., 1984; Pierotti and Rasmussen, 1976; Crutzen,
et.al., 1979; Campbell, 1986.
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base strategy than the others. Since NOx is a pollutant which is not fuel
related - unlike C02 - CO2 reduction policies have a somewhat
indeterminant effect, although again the carbon tax and nuclear strategies
seem to be the most effective. Particulate emissions ar shown in Figure 5-
17. All strategies have essentially the same pattern of gradual reductions in
the first 12-14 years of the study. Those strategies which then result in the
construction of new coal capacity -IGCCs - begin to see an increase.
The others continue the downward trend.
In chapter 3, we saw that the total emissions were a function of both
demand (total GWH) and marginal emissions (emissions / GWH). Since
demand-side price effects have not been included in this analysis, the
primary effect of the strategies examined is on marginal emissions. This is
seen in the illustrations of marginal carbon emissions (MCE) by strategy
fro the Northeast (5-18) and East Central (5-19). The patterns are very
similar to the total emissions curves of Figures 5-10 and 5-11. Note that in
the East Central, the system-wide MCE is close to 300 tons C/GWH in the
early years, essentially the same MCE as for a typical coal plant (Figure 3-
2). Because all of the strategies decrease the share of coal capacity in the
mix, or at least displace older coal with more efficient coal, the system
MCE is held fairly steady or even drops. In the Northeast, the original
MCE is much smaller - approximately 200 tons C/GWH - because of the
diversity of energy sources. Because coal plays a role in almost all of the
strategies, it is difficult to lower this value much more. Note, however,
that the nuclear strategy reduces the MCE to below 100 tons C/GWH.
The marginal S02 emissions (MSE) for the two regions are shown in
Figures 5-20 and 5-21. The patterns are almost exact mirrors of the total
emissions graphs, with marginal emissions decreasing with all strategies in
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all regions. Note the regional differences. The system MSE in the
Northeast is approximately 13 tons SO2/GWH with the base strategy; the
value is lowered to 3-9 tons SO2/GWH by the final year, depending on the
strategy chosen. The East Central system MSE is nearly 35 tons SO2/GWH
in the base year; the value is reduced to 20 tons SO2/GWH by all strategies
except early retirement, which reduces the value to below 10 tons
S02/GWH.
A major determinant of the marginal emissions is the fuel which is
used. We have already shown that, in the case of C02, carbon content in
fuels is especially important, because there is little opportunity to prevent
the carbon from being released as C02. The coal use streams are shown
for the East Central region in Figure 5-22. Most strategies show an
increase in coal use of approximately 20%, from 38-43 million tons per
year to 42-52 tons per year. The only exception is the nuclear strategy
which reduces coal use below 1989 levels only in the final years of the
study. Note also that the base strategy shows the largest increase in coal
use, as is expected.
In the two regions of study, the major alternative fuel is natural gas,
since its emissions are significantly smaller. The natural gas use streams
for the East Central are shown in Figure 5-23. Note that in the absence of
C02 reduction strategies, natural gas use remains trivial over the entire
study period, even with some GTCC construction in the base strategy.
Note that the dispatch modifier strategy and the base strategy have exactly
the same amount of natural gas capacity. With the dispatch modifier,
natural gas use is approximately 50 million MCF 15 in the final years,
115 A standard industry unit One MCF = 1000 cubic feet, not 106.
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approximately two orders of magnitude greater than the base strategy,
where the natural gas capacity is used only minimally. The no nuclear / no
coal strategy uses approximately twice this amount and the carbon tax
approximately three times this amount. Whether this amount of natural gas
would be available, particularly at assumed prices, is discussed below.
Detailed performance of specific strategies
Now that we have seen some general comparisons across strategies,
we will examine more closely the performance of each individual strategy.
Expanded analyses of all environmental emissions, costs, fuel use, and
shifts in energy generation source over time, are of particular interest.
Only those data considered most useful will be discussed.
Base
In the Northeast region base future, the base strategy resulted in
rapid increases in the emissions of carbon and total suspended particulate
(TSP), with slight reductions in the levels of acid rain precursors - S02
and nitrogen oxides (NOx). These emissions, normalized to 1989 levels,
are shown in Figure 5-24116. The increases in carbon and TSP are due to
the increased generation from coal capacity. Reductions in acid-rain pre-
cursors are due to the increased reliance on low-emissions coal capacity:
IGCCs. If the tbase strategy instead relied on more conventional pulverized
coal technology, with flue-gas desulfurization, all emissions would be
higher than seen here.
116 The emissions of the other greenhouse gases from fossil fuels -- methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide
(N20) -- are not shown because their greenhouse contributions are minimal relative to carbon emissions.
Except in the nuclear strategy, methane emissions tend to be inversely related to carbon emissions. On a
normalized graph, nitrous oxide emissions are indistinguishable from carbon emissions.
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Results of the East Central region are similar. The emissions are
shown in Figure 5-25. The lack of diversity in the capacity mix increases
the dominant role of coal capacity, causing the tighter correlations seen
here between carbon and TSP. Note that in both regions, carbon and TSP
emissions are very closely correlated with total coal use, whereas SO 2 and
NOx are more closely tied to the amount of uncontrolled coal generation
from old capacity, which decreases as new, efficient plants are brought on
line.
Nuclear
Based on the assumptions of the study about the costs of nuclear
power, the nuclear strategy is very attractive. While maintaining costs
approximately at or below the level of the base case, the nuclear strategy
results in decreases in all atmospheric emissions. Carbon emissions
decrease - both relative to the base case and in absolute terms - while
emissions of acid rain precursors are similar to those in the base case1l17
Nuclear is the only strategy which reduces all emissions in both regions
regardless of the rate of demand growth. The emissions in the Northeast
region base future are shown in Figure 5-26; East Central emissions are
shown in Figure 5-27. The reductions are dramatic when compared to the
base strategy levels (Figures 5-23 and 5-24).
Obviously, however, the issues of nuclear waste and nuclear safety
were not taken into account in this formulation. While these issues are
117 As discussed previously, the dominant effect in the emissions of acid rain precursors for a power
system is the percentage of the system's energy which is generated by uncontrolled coal (and to a lesser
extent oil) capacity. While the marginal S02 and NOx emissions of nuclear power are well below those of
IGCCs, both are orders of magnitude below the marginal emissions from existing uncontrolled capacity.
Since each displaces a similar amount of generation from this older capacity, the overall acid rain emissions
are similar between the two scenarios.
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considered by many experts to be technologically controllable' 18, recent
experience has shown the general public to be highly skeptical - with
substantial cause - of expert opinion in this area. Additionally, the capital
cost estimates are probably optimistic, and certainly assume a more
friendly regulatory environment. Due to the many other issues which
surround nuclear power, the option is not as clearly optimal as this
formulation may make it appear.
No Nuclear / No Coal
The no nuclear / no coal option was, somewhat counterintuitively,
fairly ineffective at reducing emissions significantly below those of the base
case. The emissions for the strategy are shown in Figure 5-28 (Northeast)
and Figure 5-29 (East Central). The reason for this ineffectiveness is due
to the nonlinear correlation between technology capacity and technology
energy generation, discussed in Chapter 3. While the capacity for natural
gas increases under this strategy, the energy generated is still small due to
the high marginal costs of the technology. This high marginal cost forces
two occurrences. First, the inefficient, high-emissions, baseload capacity is
forced to generate more energy - and more environmental emissions -
than required in the base strategy. Second, in later study years where the
cost of gas is high, the system may actually to choose to let energy go
unserved instead of operating a large amount of high cost generation,
sacrificing system reliability in order to keep costs down. As a result, the
costs of the no nuclear / no coal strategy are similar (in some cases even
below) to those of the base case, but do not represent costs for similar
118 Cohen, B.L., 1977; Lidsky, L.M., 1988.
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qualities of service. The impacts of natural gas - both on costs and on
emissions - would be much greater if gas-fired capacity were forced to
operate lower in the loading order 1 19.
This strategy is the first in which the availability of natural gas
becomes an important question. In the East Central region, we saw that the
final year natural gas use for the no nuclear / no coal strategy was approx-
imately 100(109) cubic feet. If, for the purposes of an order-of-magnitude
approximation, we assume the scale factor in the model is exactly four, and
that the same amount of gas would be needed in the other five regions of
the U.S., we arrive at an estimate of 2.4(1012) cubic feet needed for elec-
tricity in the final year. Natural gas consumption in the U.S was approx-
imately 17(1012) cubic feetl 20, implying - if consumption remains about
the same in other sectors - an increase in nationwide demand for gas of
approximately 15%. Whether this amount can be made available to electric
utilities is unclear, although it does not seem unreasonably high.
Dispatch Modifier
The dispatch modifier approach, as modeled, is attractive for all
emissions. The emissions for the Northeast base future are shown in
Figure 5-30. Carbon reductions, relative to the base case are significant in
all futures as would be expected. Additionally, the dispatch modifier
approach is among the most effective in the reduction of SO, (see Figure
119 Significantly lower gas prices or higher coal prices would have this effect naturally, as seen below in
the carbon tax strategy.
120 British Petroleum, 1988.
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5-12, for example)121. As was seen in the tradeoff curves of Figures 5-1
and 5-2, these emissions gains come at significant cost in the Northeast.
The impacts of the dispatch modifier are not as great in the East
Central region, as was seen in the tradeoffs of Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6.
Detailed emissions, very similar to the base strategy, are shown in Figure
5-31. Because coal is so dominant in the capacity mix, changes in the
loading order have minimal impact on the overall pattern of energy
generation. The natural gas and oil capacity which is available displaces
some existing coal capacity. allowing for small reductions in overall
emissions and small increases in cost. Clearly, the dispatch modifier has
greater impact - both on costs and on emissions - when the capacity mix
is more diverse. The natural gas demand of the dispatch modifier is of the
same order as that for the no nuclear / no coal strategy - less in the East
Central and more in the Northeast.
It must be reiterated that the dispatch modifier strategy is not
optimized either against costs or carbon emissions, but is rather the cost-
optimized base strategy expansion path dispatched with a least emissions
criterion. For this strategy to be evaluated thoroughly, an emissions
minimization algorithm must be substituted for the cost minimization
algorithm. This would then create an environmentally optimal plan, as
opposed to an economically optimal plan, as the starting point of the
analysis for apy given future. It should also be noted that while the
strategy provides significant emissions reduction in the short run, it might
be less ideal in the long term. Since the presence of high cost - low
emissions capacity increases the costs of electricity generation, there is a
121 Sulfur dioxide emissions would be even lower, and carbon emissions somewhat higher if an SO2
dispatch were used.
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strong economic incentive to minimize the amount of such capacity in the
system. This could in turn actually increase emissions.
Early Retirement
The value of the early retirement option varies regionally and with
the load growth of the system. Under all but the highest of the modeled
growth scenarios in the Northeast, early retirement is the only option
which dominates the base strategy in all attributes (See Figures 5-1, 5-2,
and 5-3). That is, early retirement of old coal capacity leads to a reduction
in emissions with a cost savings. The emissions gains are due to the
replacement and displacement of inefficient, more polluting capacity with
efficient, cleaner technologies. The gains are more significant in the early
years of the study period than in the end. The emissions for the early
retirement strategy in the Northeast base future are shown in Figure 5-32.
In this particular future, the operating cost gains from efficiency outweigh
the increased capital costs. We have seen, however, that this result does not
hold for all futures (Figures 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9).
Because of the greater amount of coal capacity in the East Central
region, the effects of the early retirement strategy are much greater than in
the Northeast. The emissions are shown in Figure 5-33. These reductions
are generally higher than seen for the same strategy in the Northeast.
Costs, however, are also higher, as was observed in the tradeoffs. The
sheer volume of the older coal capacity which must be retired in this
strategy causes capital requirements which are too high to be completely
offset by emissions improvements, even in relatively low growth futures.
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Carbon Tax
The carbon tax is consistently the highest cost alternative, as would
be expected. It should be noted, however, that this is in reality a distribu-
tional effect, since significant revenues are generated which are available
for other purposes or which might in some way be returned to customers.
For instance, in the base future of the East Central region, the total net
present value of the costs of electricity generation under the carbon tax
strategy is $119 billion. Over this time period, however, a total tax
revenue of $77 billion was created. The costs of the strategy to society as a
whole are actually $42 billion, less than 10% more than the base case.
Figure 5-34 illustrates the change in the original tradeoff curve which
result if net costs to society are plotted instead of the costs of electricity
generation. When viewed from this perspective, the carbon tax is much
more attractive.
Additionally, the higher cost of electricity generation creates an
incentive for demand reduction, an effect unaccounted for in this formula-
tion. The price elasticity of demand is negative, meaning that demand will
decrease with the increase in energy cost, but the current formulation is
equivalent to an assumption that this elasticity is zero. This demand would
certainly cause costs to be lower than stated and would probably lower
emissions as well.
The environmental effects of the tax are substantial. The strategy
allows for very high levels of sulfur dioxide reduction and for a stabiliza-
tion of carbon emissions in many futures. It is the only non-nuclear case
which is fairly robust in this regard. The emissions for the base future of
both study regions are shown in Figures 5-35 and 5-36. Emissions
reductions are primarily due to the strong incentive for the increased use
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of natural gas which this strategy creates. The natural gas requirements of
the carbon tax are the largest of all strategies. The implied effect on yearly
national demand is an increase of approximately 20%, again large but not
inconceivable. The strategy also creates strong incentives for the
accelerated introduction of post-transition non-fossil alternatives. The
primary disadvantage of the strategy lies in the unknown social impacts of
such drastic economic measures as well as the likelihood of strong political
resistance.
Effects of Load Growth
As suggested by the analysis of Chapter 3, the effects of load growth
are not as straightforward as might be expected. Load growth increases
the need for electricity generation, which, in isolation, leads to increased
costs and emissions. Load growth also acts as a driver for new capacity
additions, however. Since new capacity is generally more efficient than
existing capacity, there are some countervailing reductions in costs and
emissions. If the new capacity is an entirely different technology type -
with significantly lower emissions - emissions might be reduced even
further. The balance between these two effects differs according to
strategy choice.
In the base strategy, load growth leads to the increased costs seen in
the tradeoff curves. Carbon emissions increase steadily with higher load
growth futures as seen in Figure 5-37. Because of the effect of IGCCs,
however, S02 emissions are kept relatively stable in all but the very high
growth future, in which emissions still decrease, as illustrated in Figure 5-
38. In the nuclear strategy, the costs of electricity still rise with increased
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growth, but the effect on emissions is minimal, particularly in later study
years. The carbon emissions are shown in Figure 5-39. The carbon tax
shows somewhat mixed effects particularly in early study years (Figure 5-
40). Carbon emissions increase with growth, but are still maintained
approximately 50% below what would have been obtained with the base
strategy in the highest growth case.
As expected, some strategies display a greater robustness with regard
to load growth uncertainties. We can draw some conclusions about the
effects of programmatic attempts to reduce load growth (conservation).
First, the monetary benefits of conservation are substantial regardless of
strategy. If the costs of programs to implement such reductions in load are
less than these benefits, then conservation makes sense from a purely
economic standpoint122. Environmentally, however, the benefits of
conservation depend strongly on the supply-side strategy which is in place.
There are cross-relations between supply-side and demand-side policies
which can be synergistic if used properly or conflicting if misunderstood.
Effects of Fuel Price
The alternative fuel price uncertainty examined involved higher
prices for both oil and natural gas than in in the base case. This naturally
creates an incentive for greater use of other energy sources, particularly
coal and, if available, nuclear. Since coal is used to a greater extent,
carbon emissions are higher. This is seen in Figure 5-41, which compares
the carbon emissions for the different fuel price futures for the base
122 This has been the case since 1973 and will probably continue to be the case at the margin, since the
slack in this area is presently so great (Lovins, et.al., 1982; Goldemberg, etal., 1987). Whether this holds
true for very large amounts of conservation or for long periods of time remains to be seen.
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strategy, given base load growth. Since greater coal use is actually from
IGCCs, which displace some higher emissions coal capacity, sulfur
emissions are actually lower in the high fuel price future. This is shown in
Figure 5-42.
Regional Differences
We have already seen many of the differing effects which can be
caused by systemic differences in different regions. The primary
differences between the Northeast and East Central region are caused by
the differences in capacity mix, particularly the diversity of capacity
mix 123. The East Central dependence on coal makes immediate reductions
in carbon emissions (such as those obtained from system-oriented policies
like the dispatch modifier, early retirement, and carbon tax) more difficult
and less cost effective than in the Northeast. On the other hand,
technology-oriented strategies (such as the nuclear strategy), while slightly
more costly than in the Northeast, have dramatic effects on carbon
emissions when the technology begins to penetrate the capacity mix. Both
regions show potential for large reductions in the emissions of acid rain
precursors (at little or no cost) due to the presence of the IGCC and other
"clean coal" options.
123 This is driven by different levels of access to cheap coal and the different levels of public acceptance for
the continued operation of coal-fired plants.
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Chapter Six - Potential Strategies
Reasons for Strategy Success
Emissions reduction in the electric power sector can be accomplished
through both demand and supply efforts. Demand side efforts are success-
ful if they reduce the amount of electricity needed without overly suppress-
ing the natural stimuli for supply side technological change. Supply side
efforts are successful if large amounts of high emissions energy generation
can be displaced by low emissions generation. Different policies will ac-
complish these goals to varying degrees, depending on the emissions which
are of concern.
For the emission of primary focus here, C02, there are a few near-
term supply-side technologies available for significant reduction: nuclear
reactors, oil-fired GTCCs and gas-fired GTCCs. The nuclear alternative
not only has zero emissions, but its ability to operate economically at
baseload allows it to displace large amounts of the generation from older
coal capacity. This brings about CO2 reductions approximately equivalent
to the percentage of base year coal generation which is no longer needed.
The social and political problems with the option are substantial. The
GTCC options have significantly lower emissions than typical existing coal
capacity, but operation at baseload must be forced or induced through
policy measures. The emissions reduction will be approximately one-third
to two-thirds of the percentage of existing coal generation which is
displaced. Increases in the usage of oil and gas will raise the cost of
electricity generation, however. Additionally, there are likely to be limits
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to the availability of both of these fuels due to energy security concerns
(oil) and possible resource scarcity (gas).
In the case of acid rain precursors, S02 and NOx, the above
technological options are augmented by three additional options: IGCCs
pulverized coal with scrubbers, and fuel-switching to low-sulfur coa1124.
The IGCC is highly economical and displaces significant amounts of
generation from existing coal capacity. This brings about reduction in S02
and NOx emissions essentially equivalent to the percentage of original
uncontrolled coal generation which has been displaced. Reductions in
marginal C02 emissions of about 10% can be achieved, but are offset by
any growth in overall generation from coal. The scrubber option is
essentially effective in preventing a growth in the emissions of acid rain
precursors, but not in displacing uncontrolled coal generation (due to
higher costs). If scrubbers were installed on old coal plants as retrofits,
S02 and NOx emissions would be reduced approximately by the percentage
of uncontrolled generation which was shifted to retrofits multiplied by the
percentage effectiveness of the scrubbers (70%, 90%, etc.). Because of
decreased efficiency, scrubbers will actually increase marginal C02
emissions by about 10%, with overall emissions again increasing with
growth in overall coal-fired generation. Low-sulfur coal has similar
effects. Oil- and gas-fired combined cycle generation and/or nuclear
generation will reduce SO2 emissions by a percentage virtually equivalent
to the percentage of uncontrolled coal generation displaced, since the
124 AFBCs and PFBCs are not included here because they are unattractive when compared to the IGCC,
which uses the same fuel feedstock at lower cost, higher efficiency, and lower emissions. Additionally, the
IGCC is already being demonstrated commercially, whereas the AFBC lags several years in development
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marginal SO2 emissions of these technologies are virtually zero relative to
uncontrolled coal.
We can now define a general order of preference for technology
choice, in the absence of cost or resource constraints. If our primary
concern is the reduction of CO2 emissions, the four classes of action we can
take, in (approximate) descending order of effectiveness, are:
1) Increased use of zero-carbon baseload: This class of
actions includes the use of nuclear, hydroelectric, and non-
fossil renewable electricity generating technologies 25. Some
of these technologies do not naturally operate at baseload.
Many also have severely limited resource bases in the regions
studied (hydroelectric, solar, wind, etc.).
2) Increased use of low-carbon baseload: This class of
actions consists primarily of the use of gas turbine combined
cycle technologies, fired by oil or natural gas. These tech-
nologies do not normally operate at baseload. This class of
actions would also include the use of C02 scrubbing tech-
nologies for coal-fired generation.
3) Reduced demand: The placement of demand reduc-
tion at this level in the list assumes that annual demand reduc-
125 Biomass may be included in this category, since the lifetime net emissions of C02 into the
atmosphere from biomass are zero. The C02 which is released from the burning of biomass is CO2 which
was removed from the atmosphere during the lifetime of the plants and would have been released upon the
death and decay of the plant Biomass generation does not "short-circuit" the natural carbon cycle as does
the burning of fossil fuels.
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tions are on the same order as natural annual growth in load (a
few percent per year). In this case, the emissions reductions
are at the margin and technology substitution is suppressed. If
demand reduction were significantly more substantial, actually
lowering the amount of baseload demand, this action could be
higher in the list.
4) Increased use of low-carbon intermediate / peaking
load or increased use of higher efficiency baseload: Low-
carbon intermediate / peaking load is the natural position of
oil- and natural gas-fired technologies. Higher efficiency
baseload is the natural occurrence of new capacity construction
- in this case, construction of IGCCs. Both of these effects
are marginal and unlikely to offset any demand growth. The
ranking of the two depends on numerous characteristics of the
system.
Due to the technological differences outlined earlier, the ranking is
essentially the same for the emissions of acid rain precursors, but the
technologies which are included in each are somewhat different. For
instance, if our concern is the reduction of S02, the actions we can take, in
descending order of effectiveness (again in the absence of cost or resource
constraints), are:
1) Use of zero-SO, or low-S07 baseload: The
technologies which could be used in this class of action include
nuclear, hydroelectric, renewables, oil- or gas-fired combined
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cycles, IGCCs, FBCs, and scrubber-fitted coal plants.
Essentially all technologies which can theoretically operate at
baseload, except uncontrolled conventional coal-fired plants,
may be used in this class of actions. Some of these tech-
nologies do not naturally operate at baseload, and many are
resource-limited. Zero-S02 and low-SO2 technologies are
lumped here because the marginal emissions of these tech-
nologies are all significantly below those of uncontrolled coal
(>90%). There is no equivalent here to the 30-70% reduction
technologies available with carbon emissions 126.
2) Reduced demand: The same comments made for the
C02 case apply here. It should be noted that due to the eco-
nomical nature of many of the low-sulfur baseload options
listed above, the tendency of demand reduction to stagnate
technological substitution is a more important effect here than
with the C02 case.
3) Increased use of low-sulfur intermediate and peaking
load. This is the natural operating mode for oil- and gas-fired
technologies, including conventional steam plants, combined
cycles, and combustion turbines.
126 There are, in fact, several "clean coal" technologies, such as physical coal cleaning, which can provide
reductions in this range. Due to the economic characteristics of these technologies, and the larger gains
which can be reached through other technologies, these are not considered viable options.
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The primary difference between approaches to the SO2 problem and
the C02 problem is the economics of reduced-emissions technologies. Sev-
eral options are available for the economical accomplishment of the most
important task: increased use of low-SO2 baseload. With the exception of
the nuclear case, which may not be politically viable, this is not the case
with C02. Conservation then becomes increasingly important. Returning
to the policy levers outlined in Chapter 3, it appears that economical
supply-side options are likely to be more effective than demand-side
options. In the absence of viable technologies for the implementation of
these supply-side policies (which may be the case for C02 in the near
term), demand-side options must then be pursued.
Strategv Evaluation
The various strategies which we have examined all accomplish these
tasks to different degrees, and sometimes in unexpected ways. What, then,
can be said about the "success" of the examined strategies, both overall and
with reference to the above tasks? Additionally, what unevaluated at-
tributes of these strategies will effect the ability to address these goals?
Base
There are two fundamental observations which can be made about
emissions in the base strategy. First, in the case of C02, emissions should
be expected to rise in the absence of policy attempts to minimize them, due
primarily to the abundance of low-cost coal. It should be noted, however,
that the standard modeling assumption of constant marginal C02 emissions
(a constant value of carbon released per unit of energy obtained) does not
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apply, since conversion efficiency tends to increase over time. This effect
occurs for economic reasons in the absence of regulatory policy, and is
completely consistent with past experience' 27. This can be recognized as a
minimally positive action, belonging to the least effective group listed
above. The second observation concerns the emissions of acid rain pre-
cursors. Present legislation and economic incentives alone will cause SO2
emissions to eventually decrease from present levels as old capacity retires
and as new baseload demand is met by cleaner technology (an action
belonging to the most effective S02-reduction group). It should be noted
that this decrease will occur very gradually.
Even though the base strategy is unsuccessful in reducing C02 emis-
sions and is slow in its successes with SO02, the advantages are numerous.
No political action is required, and utilities can continue to operate as they
have in the past. Coal interests continue to be served, as coal continues to
play a prominent, if not dominant, role in electricity generation. Since the
U.S. is fairly self-sufficient in coal, there are few problems with excess
reliance on foreign energy sources. The disadvantages are primarily envi-
ronmental. If C02 is a real concern, this strategy is ineffective in address-
ing that concern. Emissions of particulates are also expected to rise.
Finally, even the moderate growth rates of the study base cases indicate a
need for substantial siting of new plants to begin in the next ten years. In
the recent past, this has not been a trivial task, particular in high population
density areas such as the Northeast. Finally, it should be noted that the
127 Note that policies may inadvertently cause a decrease in efficiency. For instance, policies which
mandate sulfur scrubbers can cause a discontinuity in the trend of efficiency improvements, although once
implemented, the efficiency of the mandated technology can be expected to increase over time with
operating experience.
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costs for electricity generation in the next twenty-five years will be sub-
stantial, even in a cost-minimizing strategy such as this one.
Nuclear
The nuclear strategy is very attractive both economically and envi-
ronmentally. While requiring expenditures essentially equivalent to the
base strategy, the nuclear strategy significantly reduces C02 emissions, not
only relative to the base, but relative to 1989 levels as well. The strategy's
effectiveness is due to its ability to accomplish the most important emis-
sions reduction task - increased use of zero-carbon baseload - relatively
painlessly. That is, the economics of the nuclear option make extensive
use, once constructed, automatic. Its technological characteristics lead to
reduced emissions. Emissions of acid rain precursors are also reduced,
although not significantly more than in the base case. This is due to the
fact that the characteristics of IGCCs and nuclear reactors are essentially
the same with regard to these emissions - low emissions and baseload
operation capability.
Nuclear power has many other disadvantages, however. Nuclear
waste disposal has never been adequately addressed. Feasible technical
solutions, have been offeredl 28, but it is unclear that the political will exists
to deal with this issue on a purely technical basis. Nuclear safety is a major
concern. The reactors which were used in this study have advanced safety
features, but are still based heavily on conventional light water reactor
designs. While experts have often vociferously proclaimed the safety of
nuclear power, particularly in comparison with other societal activities 129,
128 Cohen, B.L., 1977.
129 Cohen, B.L., 1977; Sutton, C., 1988; Slovic, 1987.
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the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents may have forever soured
the public's acceptance of these risk assessments. Additionally, it is unclear
that the traditional formulation of risk 130 is truly as rational as it might
appear in low probability - high consequence situations, such as those
associated with nuclear power. Fear of nuclear proliferation is also a
major concern, particularly if we begin to look at nuclear power as an
option throughout the world. Since this issue is essentially beyond any
feasible technical control, this is the issue which has even the "experts"
worried131 . It should finally be said that all of these issues will be barriers
to any further use of nuclear power. The feasibility of a policy which calls
for massive nuclearization instead of coal-fired capacity is even lower.
The public acceptance of nuclear power and a more consistent
regulatory environment are essentially an assumption of the nuclear option
in this study. Without these preexisting conditions, utilities are unlikely to
invest further in nuclear power. With these conditions, the costs are likely
to be very close to those assumed in the study. If the capital costs of
nuclear power are more in line with recent experience (two to three times
larger than assumed here) the nuclear option becomes less of a dominant
one, but still within the set of attractive options. To illustrate this, Figure
7-1 shows the carbon-cost tradeoff curve of Figure 6-1 with a tripling of
the nuclear power capital costs. The option is costly, but still within the
optimal set.
Perhaps a more likely scenario for the future use of nuclear power
involves one of the more advanced nuclear technologies with passive safety
features. The advantages and disadvantages of these options have been
130 Risk = (Probability of outcome) x (Consequence of outcome)
131 Rose and Lester, 1978.
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discussed at length elsewhere 132. It will only be said here that these
options are less economically attractive and, in the absence of policy
initiatives, are unlikely to compete with coal on a one-to-one basis in the
near term. While these options, particularly the modular high-temperature
gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR), may indeed prove to be attractive options
for emissions reduction in the long term, they have very little role to play
in transitional strategies.
No Nuclear / No Coal
The no nuclear / no coal option, as modeled, was almost completely
ineffective. This was for the simple reason that extensive construction of
natural gas-fired capacity does not guarantee that any of it will be used. At
present fuel prices, and in the absence of policy initiatives, natural gas
capacity will not be lower in the system loading order than coal. Without
displacing baseload, the option accomplishes only the least effective
reduction task on all emissions - increased use of low emissions inter-
mediate and peaking load. The dominant source of emissions continues to
operate as before, and in fact may be forced to operate more because of the
lack of efficient baseload replacements.
This policy has several distinct political disadvantages as well. While
it is less successful at decreasing the use of coal than some of the other
policy strategieq outlined below, it might appear to be more so because of
its direct nature and apparent favoritism. Implementation of the policy
would require a regulatory mandate for the construction of natural gas and
oil capacity and/or a moratorium on nuclear and coal. While not
132 Taylor, 1989; Lidsky, 1988; Golay and Todreas, 1990.
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completely impossible, past experience has revealed just the opposite
tendency. The oil shocks of the 1970s have created a skittishness about oil.
Sectors which do not fundamentally need oil, such as electric utilities, have
consciously tried to reduce their dependence. In the late 1970s, natural gas
was considered a premium fuel which was "too good to burn" 133, and its
use by utilities was limited. The other major disadvantage of this strategy
is that system reliability, as measured by the amount of unserved energy,
tends to decrease under this policy. While, this reduction is at a level
calculated to be economically optimal given the present costs associated
with unserved energy, these costs are likely to be much greater when the
amount is very large, as is the case in the study.
Dispatch Modifier
The dispatch modifier is a fairly effective strategy, with costs
increasing proportionally with emissions reduction. The carbon dispatch is
particularly effective because it successfully forces low emissions capacity,
particularly natural gas, into baseload operation. In fact, for a given
capacity mix and demand, carbon dispatch releases the minimum amount of
emissions possible. The modifier is most effective, and most costly, when
the capacity mix is diverse, since there is a greater amount of low
emissions capacity available for baseload displacement.
There are several disadvantages, however. The first is the high level
of cost increase which this strategy entails, as we saw in Chapter 5. The
second is the large amount of natural gas required by the strategy. It is not
apparent that this amount of fuel use will be sustainable, given the limited
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133 Lee, Ball, and Tabors, 1990.
resource base, or even available to the utility industry. A third dis-
advantage is the requirement for the reprogramming of power dispatch
centers. The dispatch modifier would require a fundamental change in the
way power systems operate. While this is not infeasible (or even
undesirable, perhaps) it would undoubtedly be costly and time-consuming,
an effect which was not accounted for in this study.
Finally, the dispatch modifier, while highly effective for reducing
emissions from a given system, does not in any way reduce emissions
through capacity mix changes. In fact, since the construction of low
emissions capacity will actually increase the costs of electricity generation,
the carbon dispatch rules encourage the exclusive construction of low-cost
(and probably high-emissions) supply. Utility planners seeking to mini-
mize costs under the constraints of carbon dispatch rules might actually
face an incentive to build higher emissions capacity than they would have
otherwise. To counter this effect, some method by which capacity con-
struction could be planned to minimize emissions - similar to the methods
of minimizing cost used generally by businesses - would have to be used.
How such a modification to the dispatch modifier policy would be imple-
mented is unclear.
Early Retirement
The early retirement strategy is an option with several attractive
features. In low and moderate growth futures of the Northeast region, the
early retirement option is the only one which dominates the base strategy
on all attributes. That is, early retirement is the only strategy which not
only reduces all emissions relative to the base strategy, but reduces costs as
well. The reason for the strategy's emissions reduction success is that it
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accomplishes high emissions generation is not only displaced, but replaced
by newer more efficient technologies. In higher growth futures, however,
the early retirement is the only strategy which is itself dominated by the
base strategy. Also, the strategy in the East Central region, while leading
to even larger emissions reductions, does increase costs substantially.
The implication of these results is that there is some optimal level of
win-win improvement - that is simultaneous improvement in both costs
and emissions - which can be made if utilities are willing to abandon some
inefficient plants for new ones. At this optimal level, the efficiency
improvements are sufficient to offset the capital costs of new construction.
If the need for new construction becomes higher than this optimal level, the
capital costs will be too high to be offset by efficiency improvements. This
will be the case if growth is too high (observed in the higher growth cases
of both regions) or if the level of capacity retirement relative to the entire
system is too high (seen even at moderate growth in the East Central region
where the capacity of older coal plants is much higher than in the
Northeast).
Clearly in the absence of efforts to keep growth down, the early
retirement strategy can only be of limited usefulness. In conjunction with
conservation efforts, however, the strategy appears to have a common-
sense appeal. The strategy would likely be met with enthusiasm by envi-
ronmentalists who would like to see the most polluting plants shut down. If
utilities are convinced that money can be saved (much more likely when it
is their own models and data which indicate this to be the case) the strategy
might provide some no-regrets options for expansion planning. It should
finally be noted that this strategy need not be as direct (or even intentional)
as implied in this formulation. Regulatory policies which make the
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operation of inefficient plants too uneconomic - by requiring scrubber
retrofits, for instance - may indirectly lead to the early retirement of
older coal capacity.
Carbon Tax
The carbon tax strategy is particularly appealing to those who prefer
market-based strategies. In theory, if the environmental costs of carbon
emissions (or any other pollutant) are internalized into the costs of
electricity generation, the same profit incentives which lead utilities to seek
cost-optimal solutions for electricity generation will lead utilities to
solutions which are an optimal balance between costs and emissions. The
problem with the carbon tax is not in the theory, but rather in the imple-
mentation. Defining the "costs" of any environmental pollutant are diffi-
cult enough, a problem which expands geometrically as new externalities
(SO2, solid waste, land use, etc.) are considered. This cost definition is
even more difficult with a substance such as C02 whose environmental ef-
fects are not fully understood and, indeed, not even guaranteed. Tradition-
ally, the effects of pollution are external to the polluter, but internal to
some policy-making authority (i.e., a local or national government). With
CO2, the effects are not only likely to be across many sovereign authori-
ties, but delayed by several generations. Traditional econo-mics, which
drives the choice of the carbon tax as the most efficient strategy, is
essentially useless in providing the tools for the proper implementation of
the strategy. Finally, of course, even if an optimal taxing level could be
defined, public acceptance is hardly a foregone conclusion, as recent
political experience has shown.
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At the somewhat arbitrary, although purposely substantial, level of
carbon tax examined in this study, the environmental effects are significant.
The carbon tax accomplishes all of the supply-side tasks outlined for
emissions reduction, increasing the level of low emissions technology used
at all levels of operation from baseload through peak by rearranging the
loading order in a dynamic fashion1 34. If we assume that the tax is at the
correct level and exactly internalizes the social costs of carbon, this
reordering is done in a socially optimal manner, and is accomplished
without explicit regulation of utility actions. Once the prices are set, the
utility merely acts to minimize costs. We can additionally assume, that if
price-oriented feedback were allowed into the demand side, the carbon tax
would induce conservation which would lower costs and further lower
emissions. We have seen that, as modeled, the tax creates substantial new
cost burdens for the utility industry, although much of the additional cost is
in the form of tax revenues, which would then be available for different
purposes.
Conservation
Conservation was not explicitly modeled as a strategy option, but its
effects were observed through the modeling of various load growth
uncertainties. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the environmental effects
of conservation are mixed. When conservation does not interfere with the
most important task of displacing high emissions baseload by overly
stagnating the natural construction of new capacity (usually technologies
with high efficiency and low emissions), the environmental improvements
134 The effectiveness of the strategy is based on the assumed availability of a low emissions alternative -
in this case, natural gas, the resources of which may be limited.
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are substantial. The primary implication is that interactions between
supply side and demand side policies must be recognized and accounted for
in the development of emissions reduction strategies.
The main difficulty with conservation strategies concerns
implementation. Even when conservation is clearly of economic benefit,
beyond any environmental considerations, implementation is not at all
straightforward. First, under the regulations which many utilities face,
prices are set per kilowatt-hour. The only way for utilities to increase
profits under these sorts of regulations is to increase sales - a strong
disincentive against conservation. One viable solution to this dilemma is
least-cost planning, an approach presently being adopted in limited areas of
the countryl 35. For consumers, the economic benefits of conservation are
realized through lower electric bills. To obtain these benefits, however,
requires initial investment in higher efficiency items, such as light bulbs,
refrigerators, and so on. While the payback period is usually very small
for such items, on the order of six months to two years for many items,
many barriers exist which prevent typical consumers from making these
investmentsl 36 . Many creative plans are being developed by utilities to
encourage or assist in least-cost investments, but the extent of success which
these programs will achieve remains to be seen 137.
Most Promising Strategies
The objective of this study has not been to develop projections
of energy futures or to develop highly specific policy recommendations for
135 Moskovitz, 1989; Cavanaugh, 1989; Joskow, 1990.
136 Lovins, etal., 1982; Goldemberg, et.al., 1987; Williams, 1989b.
137 Cicchetti and Hogan, 1990; Cohen and Townsley, 1990; Geller, 1989; Williams, 1989b.
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greenhouse gas abatement. The focus has instead been on illustrating that a
range of options exists, that useful policy options may be suggested by a
deeper understanding of the systems involved, and that with an
understanding of the involved systems, we can choose those policies which
best meet diverse social goals, discarding those which are less effective.
Clearly, the few options which have been examined in this study do
not constitute a complete menu. They do, however, provide some insight
into what characteristics a successful strategy might have. The most
striking point illustrated by the study is that, in the absence of conservation,
the only option which is useful for reducing C02 emissions involves the
single short-term alternative for cheap, low-emissions, baseload capacity:
nuclear power. In the absence of nuclear power - a strong possibility
even in the face of climate change - or the sudden emergence of another
low-emissions alternative as economical, electricity demand must be kept
down in order to actually reduce emissions below present levels.
This apparent need for conservation recalls another major theme of
this study: demand-side management, in the absence of complimentary
supply-side policies, is not the environmental panacea which it appears to
be. If conservation is actively pursued (a complex, though probably
economically beneficial, strategy), the accompanying supply side-policies
can take several forms, depending on the time frame of desired emissions
reductions and ,the level of reduction desired. Small reductions can be
made quickly, at little or no cost, by retiring inefficient capacity. This also
encourages the accelerated construction of higher efficiency capacity,
which may or may not have significantly lower emissions. Large
reductions can be made quickly through modifications in the system
dispatch rules, but these reductions come at large cost and provide no long-
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term incentives for emissions reduction. Finally, large reductions can be
obtained in both the short and long term through carbon-based taxes, with
accompanying large distributional effects on the cost of electricity
generation. Outright bans on the construction of new coal capacity will do
little for emissions reduction unless either the nuclear (or some similar)
option is viable or there are policies which favor the construction and use
of low emissions capacity, even if the costs are high (i.e., with natural gas).
This appears less efficient, but may have the advantage (or disadvantage,
depending on one's point of view) of direct implementation. The optimum
combinations of such policies (and modifications thereof), and the
processes by which such combinations can be agreed upon and
implemented, is the focus of Chapter 7.
160
Chapter Seven - Emissions Reduction in Context
The Politics of Carbon Dioxide
The development of policies for the mitigation of (or adaptation to)
climate change will undoubtedly be a very complex process. Perhaps only
with the threat of nuclear war has the world ever been faced with a
problem of such potentially far-reaching consequences; perhaps never
before has the world been faced with a problem with such far-reaching and
diverse causes. The previous chapters have provided some tools for
addressing a well-defined segment of the problem and partially evaluated
some of the suggested solutions. We will now turn our attention to the
processes by which coherent and specific policies might be developed and
implemented, with the focus still on the electric power sector, but given the
broader context of the climate change issue as well as socio-economic
realities. With this goal in mind, we will examine the various actors and
institutions involved in the climate change issue, the processes by which
change occurs in the involved systems, and the mechanisms through which
appropriate changes might be encouraged.
The list of actors with a stake in climate change and climate change
policy could not be more comprehensive. All people are in some way
linked to the causes of climate change, through their use of energy, agri-
cultural products, and so on; all people will be affected by climate change
policy since it must seek to alter these activities in some way; all people, or
their children, will be affected in some way if large-scale climate change
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becomes a reality. The effects of climate change will even reach beyond
humanity, fundamentally altering ecosystems and possibly causing mass
extinctions. Beyond these observations, which imply a need for some level
of social consensus on the climate change issue, there are a few individuals
and groups with very specific roles to play in this process.
The first of these are the governmental actors who will have to play
a role in the development, encouragement, and enforcement of any climate
change policy. Even these are nearly too numerous to mention, as they
span from individuals in local governments to diplomats in the highest
international context. At the local and regional level, governmental actors
will include executives (mayors, governors, etc.), legislators, and
regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies of interest might include envi-
ronmental protection bureaus, economic development bureaus, and public
utility commissions. The list can be directly extrapolated to the national
level, where in the U.S., the agencies with a stake include groups as diverse
as the EPA, DOE, NASA, and the State Department. The international
context of the issue extends the playing field to officials and groups in
foreign governments, as well as quasi-governmental international organiza-
tions such as the U.N. and the OECD. Not all of these foreign govern-
ments see climate change as undesirable (the USSR might have more land
for agriculture, for instance) and some see climate change policies as
directly in opposition with other national goals (i.e., China, which intends
to exploit its massive coal resources).
The second group of actors are the industrial groups which will
probably bear much of the responsibility for behavioral change. The most
obvious of these are the industries whose processes or products are most
directly responsible for greenhouse gas emissions: electric utilities, pri-
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mary energy producers, automobile manufacturers, energy-intensive
manufacturing firms, agriculture, and so on. Many other industries use the
products of these firms (electricity, primary fuels, cars, etc.) and will be
fundamentally affected by any limits or price changes associated with these
products. Finally, there are those companies which might benefit (or be
created) in the face of strong climate change policies. Among these might
be photovoltaic firms, natural gas utilities, or manufacturers of high-
efficiency appliances.
A third group which has been and will be fundamentally involved
with the development of climate change policies is the scientific and
technical community. Much of climate change policy will depend on the
opinions of scientists about the causes, extent, and timing of climate change.
Likewise, technology and the opinions of experts about technological
potential are likely to play an important role in solutions to climate change.
For the sake of brevity, the remaining actors will be grouped in the
overly aggregated category of special interests. Foremost in this category
are the environmental groups who are most likely to press for climate
change policies. We have already noted that this is no longer a specialized
group - approximately 15.9 million people worldwide are members of
one or more environmental groups, up from 13.3 million only one year
before138.We may also include in this group such diverse special interests
as unions, for wyhom jobs may be gained or lost due to climate change or
climate change policy, or consumer groups, which might be opposed (or in
favor) of fuel efficiency standards or energy taxes.
138 Time, "The Fight to Save the Planet", 12/18/89.
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Institutions
The institutions through which climate change policy might be
shaped and enacted closely parallel the actors outlined above, so the list will
not be repeated here. The additional institutions which will play a role in
the climate change issue are primarily those created specifically because of
this issue. Included among these are the scientific institutions created for
study of the scientific aspects of this and related issues, such as MIT's
Center for Global Change Science or the International Institute of Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna, as well as those designed to assist in
policy formulation and implementation, such as the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). There are many international agencies designed
to deal with other environmental (United Nations Environmental Program
- UNEP) or economic (European Economic Community - EEC) issues,
which have taken up climate change policy in some form as well.
Drivers of Change
Many processes have acted or may act as drivers to change the sys-
tems involved in the climate change issue. The primary processes of im-
portance to the climate change issue are economic and population growth.
As the number of people has grown, and their demand for higher standards
of living has grown, so have grown the activities which contribute to
climate change. In the past, the only limits to this growth have been caused
by technological innovation and independent concerns such as those over
other environmental problems. All of these fundamental processes will
continue to have broad effects. Several other processes may now lead to
limitations on greenhouse-forcing activities. First, increased scientific
discovery and enhanced measurement have led to an awareness about
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potential problems. Second, political pressure has been brought to bear by
environmental interest groups and those who perceive potential loss due to
climate change. Third, media coverage of this and other transnational
environmental issues, such as acid rain and ozone depletion, has accelerated
a common perception of great environmental danger, which has in turn
intensified the environmental movement and increased political pressure.
All of this, of course, is still in tension with ever present demands for high
standards of living.
Points of Intervention
With this broader context in mind, we will now return our focus to
the electric power sector, outlining those places where climate change
policies might be directed in order to effect change. Similar outlines could
be developed for other sectors. The intervention points which might be
used to affect the electric power sector include the following:
1) Production of Primary Energy: Policies could be
developed which limit in some way the amount of coal or oil is
produces, or change the price of producing primary energy.
This would affect sectors other than electric power as well.
2) Consumption of Primary Energy: Prices or
quantities could again be altered, as was modeled with the car-
bon tax strategy, or primary energy distribution systems (such
as natural gas pipelines) could be limited or encouraged.
Again, such strategies might also affect other sectors.
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3) Production of Non-Electric Intermediate Energy:
Policies could be directed at encouraging (or discouraging) the
production and use of non-electric intermediate energy (such
as natural gas for home heating) in order to alter electricity
demand or increase overall energy efficiency.
4) Production of Electricity: Climate change policies
could seek to alter the capacity mix (as with the early
retirement strategy) or the way in which the capacity mix is
used (as with the dispatch modifier). Policies may be directed
at individual power plants or at any aggregation thereof.
5) Transmission and Distribution: Policies could alter
the transmission and distribution of electric power. Goals of
such policies might be to limit access to electricity or to min-
imize electricity losses in transmission lines in an effort to
reduce total energy generation requirements. Policies directed
at this area might also alter the way in which interconnected
power grids transfer electricity. Greater transfer can increase
total generation efficiency and smooth peak demandsl 39.
6), End Use of Electricity: All of the demari side
policies listed in Chapter 3 would be included in this category.
139 The load factor for a system which spans several time zones is higher because peak demand is spread
over more hours. This is a prime motivation behind proposals for greater interconnection between
European power systems.
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7) End Effects of Electric Power: Policies might be
targeted directly at atmospheric CO2 levels, for instance. Such
policies are appealing in that they attack the concern directly,
but suffer from a lack of connection to the root causes, which
in this case are highly diverse and decentralized.
8) Planning of Electric Power Systems: Policies could
attempt to directly alter planning decisions, through mandates
or subsidies of particular technologies, for example, or they
could in some way alter the planning process itself. Several of
the studied strategies use this approach.
9) Technological Innovation: Policies could be directed
at the research, development, and/or demonstration of alterna-
tive technologies for use in the electric power sector.
Mechanisms for Change
As suggested by the examples given above, policies directed at any
particular point of intervention may take a variety of forms. These various
policy mechanisms are generic to all areas of regulation, although some
obviously will have more applicability in the electric power sector than
others 40. The two primary categories of such mechanisms may be classi-
fied as direct regulation and incentive-based regulation. More indirect
informational mechanisms, such as advertising campaigns or educational
140 A more comprehensive list can be found in the DOE report A Compendium of Options for
Government Policy to Encourage Private Sector Responses to Potential Climate Change (1989), which
also lists numerous examples of what form such policies might take in various sectors, including electric
power.
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programs, and innovation-based mechanisms, such as support for demon-
strations of new technologies, have important roles to play but will not be
examined exhaustively here.
Direct regulation includes two broad categories of mechanisms:
command-and-control regulation and standards. Command-and-control
regulation can take the form of limits, quotas, or outright bans on particu-
lar materials, transactions, or activities. Among these might be fuel use,
fuel production, technology use, or environmental emissions. Command-
and-control regulation might also be directed directly at price or profit
levels. This is, in fact, a large part of present utility regulation already,
with electricity prices and rates of return mandated by regulatory agencies.
The second set of direct mechanisms - standards - could detail
technological specifications which must be met by power plants. Regula-
tions which establish maximum heat rates or which specify particular
technologies for use, such as sulfur scrubbers or particulate removal
systems, would be included in this category.
The main advantage of command-and-control legislation is its direct
nature, which makes it relatively easy to implement and enforce if
correctly designed. This direct nature also tends to be politically more
acceptable to pro-regulation interests (i.e., environmentalists) and less so to
those who are regulated. The primary disadvantage of such mechanisms is
economic inefficiency. If quotas, levels, or technologies are not chosen
correctly, emissions reductions may come at greater cost than was
necessary, or not at all, and incentives to seek new methods or technologies
may be stifled. This is likely to be the case, particularly when such choices
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are made by regulators or legislators unfamiliar with the system or the
technological possibilitiesl 41.
The second broad category, incentive-based regulations, are based on
free market principles which assert that once prices are "right" (that is,
once all external social costs such as environmental damages are included),
the same mechanisms which lead individuals and firms to maximize profits
will lead individuals and firms to maximize social benefits. Incentive-based
regulation can take many forms, the foremost of which are taxes and
subsidies. These taxes and subsidies may be applied at almost any of the
intervention points above. For instance, an attempt to internalize the cost
of S02 emissions might place taxes on the production of high-sulfur fuels,
the purchase of these fuels, sulfur emissions, or the price of electricity
itself. Likewise, subsidies might be given for the production or purchase
of low-emissions fuels or technologies, the removal of S02 from stack
gases, or for conservation programs. Combinations of such systems are
also possible 142. Another incentive-based system, included in several of
the most recent U.S. Clean Air proposals, involves the use of tradeable
emissions permits. Under such a system, each utility, for instance, is
permitted to emit a certain level of pollution. If it can reduce pollution
below those levels, it can sell its extra permits to those companies to whom
such a purchase is cheaper than emissions reductions. This allows for
141 Ackerman and Hassler (1981) discuss how the choice of scrubbers as the mandated technology for
sulfur removal, and the poor design of the accompanying legislation, has actually led to increases in S02
emissions, at great cost.
142 DOE (1989) refers to such a system as "deposit-refund" and suggests an innovative approach to carbon
emissions, wherein taxes are placed on the purchase of carbon-based fuels, but then subsidies are awarded
based on carbon removal, such as through scrubbing or the planting of biological offsets (afforestation).
Such a system would act similarly to the carbon tax of the study in the short term, but would provide a
long-term incentive for the innovation of carbon removal strategies.
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economically efficient emissions reduction, since emissions are reduced
first by those most capable of doing so143.
The primary advantage of incentive-based regulation is its theoretical
economic efficiency and its flexibility. Its indirect nature is often a
political liability. For instance, may environmental groups have criticized
the recent Clean Air proposals because they give industry "the right to
pollute", even though this total amount of pollution may be less than
otherwise possible. The second problem with this type of regulation is that
the transaction costs and informational requirements for such systems to
operate may be very high. There are few reliable estimates, for instance,
about what the costs of pollution permit markets and brokers will be, and
whether this will counteract the theoretical efficiency of the system.
Policy Objectives and Barriers to Change
The many diverse, and often conflicting, objectives which any cli-
mate change policy must pursue, or at least consider, have already been
mentioned and will only be outlined here. The primary ones are those
considered quantitatively in this study: minimized costs of electricity
generation and reduced C02 emissionsl 44 . Also of unarguable importance
are positive effects on other environmental objectives, reliable electricity
supply, safe supply, and maximized energy security. Other objectives
which might be added, are robustness to uncertainty (flexibility), distribu-
tional equity (across present society and possibly intergenerational), and
143 Another special type of incentive might also be included in this category, the potential of which is
driven by the vastness of government itself. The mechanism is the direct purchase (or end of purchasing)
by the government of some item or technology for which it wishes to create (or eliminate) markets. For
instance, a mandate for all government buildings to be equipped with energy efficient light bulbs and
el4ipment would instantly create a larger market for such items.1 Or perhaps reduced climatic effects of CO2 emissions.
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sustainability (political, economic, and environmental). Many others, of
course, are possible, particularly at a more specific level.
The criteria by which we can judge the success or failure of any
particular climate change policy are parallel to the objectives we have
outlined for the policy above. For any particular individual or interest, the
weighting of these objectives might be very different (emissions are more
important than costs to an environmentalist) as might be the degree of
perceived accomplishment of any particular objective (costs, if distributed
unevenly, will be perceived differently by different parties). Individuals
have their own individual criteria for policy success based on their per-
sonal values. Perhaps the best criterion for measuring success then
becomes acceptability. If enough of a society's members accept a certain
policy as meeting their own personal objectives, then the policy may be
deemed a success.
Given this general statement, what conditions must be met to ensure
that the criterion is met? First, the policy must have legitimacy. In order
for members of a society to accept a policy as striving toward their own
objective, they must feel as if they have some control over the choice of
that policy. Methods for increasing the participation in policy-making are
discussed at greater length below. Second, appropriate and acceptable tools
must be made available to those making policy decisions and evaluating
policy success., For instance, controversy over the accuracy of the climate
models which have driven concerns over climate change is likely to
continue to be a barrier to the policy-making process. This reality is a
primary motivator for the choice of data and models in this study. If the
basic assumptions of an analysis are suspect to the utility industry, the
conclusions and recommendations of such an analysis will be meaningless.
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Similarly, interested parties must be satisfied with the tools used to measure
success (avoided costs or emissions data, for instance), or the policy will
suffer from lack of acceptability.
The constraints which may prevent any policy from meeting the
general criterion for success are particularly substantial in the case of
climate change policy. Just meeting the first conditions is a non-trivial
task. The diversity and number of actors involved in this issue makes the
problem of participation and legitimacy very difficult. Even if full
participation could be obtained, it is not clear that any particular policy
would be acceptable to enough of the actors, given the diversity of their
interests. The acceptability of tools may also be difficult to achieve. There
will never be a 100% accurate and reliable climate model, nor will there be
a completely reliable model of the socio-economic impacts of climate
change or policies to prevent it. Whether any model can be made reliable
enough to gain broad acceptance (or is so already) is not clear. Similarly,
the objectives we have listed as most important - costs and climatic effects
- are nearly impossible to measure, particularly relative to those which
might have occurred in the absence of any given policy. Gaining
acceptability for those measurements which can be made will be difficult.
There are, of course, many other constraints, some of which are
generic and some of which are due to the peculiarities of the climate
change issue. The foremost of these is the tension (and perceived
incompatibility) between the objectives of economic growth and environ-
mental protection. This might even be generalized to the strong societal
tension in the U.S. between those who advocate laissez-faire policies, to
allow market forces to control such societal concerns as environmental
protection, and those who advocate interventionist policies to correct what
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are perceived as failures in the market. Other constraints are a reflection
of these tensions. Recent experience with regulation of other environ-
mental residuals has shown the utility industry to be sluggish to respond to
calls for environmental protection measures. In fact, the industry has dug
in its heels in costly efforts to prevent such measures. Similarly, envi-
ronmental interests have been so distrustful of industry and government,
that they tend to fight any measures which are perceived as "sell-outs",
often delaying what might be productive actions. The third point of this
triangle, government, has poorly balanced these competing interests and
often enacted inefficient legislation and regulationl 45.
Other constraints are reflective of the long-term nature of the
climate change issue. People already have an aversion to anything
perceived to be a tax, as reflected in the U.S. election campaigns in recent
years. This is even more likely to be so when the costs of a policy are
clear and in the present, such as would be the case with higher electricity
bills, and the benefits are vague and in the future, as is the case with
avoided climate change. This is exacerbated by a pervasive "technological-
fix" mentality. Many people advocate a wait-and-see policy, in which it is
assumed that if disastrous climate change becomes a reality, society will
have had time to develop technologies which will counteract climate
changes. The various proposals have included suggestions to inject SO2 or
dust into the upper atmosphere in order to simulate the cooling effect of
volcanoes or nuclear winter, as well as suggestions to cover the ocean with
styrofoam chips to increase the reflectivity of the earth's surfacel 46. These
proposals are made with varying degrees of seriousness, but all with the
145 Ackerman and Hassler, 1981.
146 Broecker, 1985; Bach, 1984; New York Times, 8/16/88.
173
underlying point that we will be able to think of something if the problem
is bad enough, and it will not cost money until that time comes. While
there is historical precedent to support the assumption that technology will
progress well beyond what we can presently imagine, there is also
precedent for the assumption that incremental technological-fixes in com-
plex systems can lead to irreversible, unexpected, and unavoidable conse-
quences147 .
Overcoming the Constraints / Pursuing the Objectives
Obviously, the challenges to the policy process will be formidable.
There is reason to believe, however, that climate change initiatives may not
only be possible but may, to some extent, be inevitable. As was discussed
in Chapter 1, environmental issues have begun to affect political agendas at
all levels, and the public support for environmental initiatives appears to be
growing. The challenge is to make policies which are sensible, sustainable,
and acceptable.
All of the actors which were outlined earlier in this chapter will have
an important role to play. Foremost among these are the scientists
providing the warnings about climate change (or refutations thereof).
Scientists must recognize that their role in this issue will be long-lived and
iterative. They must seek to be completely accurate and honest in their
assessments of the evidence at hand. Any attempt to overstate claims or
selectively ignore evidence in order to justify policies which reflect
personal values will only create distrust of science and subsequent backlash.
147 The series of decisions which led to the explosion of the U.S. space shuttle Challenger, or the nuclear
accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, provide examples of how large systems can get beyond the
control of technology if the systems are not properly controlled from the outset. The energy / climate
system is, of course, infinitely more complex than these.
174
A similar comment can be made about the mass media, whose role in
this issue will also be fundamental for a long period of time. Many adults
in the U.S. get all or most of the knowledge they obtain after high school
from television. This gives the members of the media a very important
informational and educational role, whether they want it or not. The role
of the media can be very positive in this regard, but if reporting is too
biased or too inattentive of evidence which does not fit into preconceived
notions, credibility is eventually lost. If this powerful communication tool
is lost, then the building of national (or international) consensus will be all
the more difficult.
The role perceived here for government is fairly simple in concept,
although undoubtedly more difficult to implement. The first of the tasks is
merely educational. This can be general, through support of general
environmental awareness programs or through sponsorship of scientific
and political conferences on the issue, or specific, through the support of
research on technological and political options. Such activities are already
underway within agencies such as DOE, EPA, OTA, and others. The
second task involves the setting of general goals. Foremost among such
goals might be national implementation of least-cost planning and the
inclusion of environmental concerns in the planning process. Goals might
even be as specific as the setting of national targets for emissions reduction
(such as the 20% reduction by 2005 suggested by the Schneider and Wirth
bills148).
The final task would then be the establishment of processes through
which consensus policies might be built, followed by action based on
148 The National Energy Policy Act of 1989 (Timothy Wirth [D-Colorado] S. 324); The Global Warming
Prevention Act of 1989 (Claudine Schneider [R-Rhode Island] H.R. 1078).
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consensus decisions. One model for such consensus-building processes is
that used by the Analysis Group for Regional Electricity Alternatives
(AGREA) in New England 149, in which a wide variety of parties (environ-
mentalists, utilities, regulators, citizen groups, etc.) are brought together to
outline possible policy options for meeting their various goals. Technical
analysts then use a set of agreed upon tools to generate data about the
effectiveness of the options (similar to the data presented in Chapter 5).
The parties can then use the data to eliminate those options which are
clearly inferior and determine what tradeoffs might make sense. In this
way, the different values of the parties are made clear, and consensus can
begin to build around common goals. Final action, by government,
utilities, or others, can then be taken according to decisions which are
legitimized by their wide participation.
Reasonable Approaches to Emissions Reduction
Although any specific recommendations given here for emissions
reduction would be incompatible with the above recommendations for
consensus building, some outlining of those general options which appear
most reasonable for the U.S. electric power industry, based on the analysis
of this study, is in order. Again, the model analysis has provided only a
limited window for viewing a complete option set. Final policy decisions,
of course, would have to be based on more detailed analysis of
combinations and modifications of the most promising options.
Ideal strategies are likely to contain the following options:
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149 Connors, et.al., 1989.
1) Conservation: Conservation appears to be a fairly
robust strategy, both for cost and C02 emissions reduction,
providing a strong win-win situation when used appropriately.
Exceptions to the robustness occur when a technology is avail-
able for cheap, low-emissions baseload generation, the adop-
tion of which is stifled by conservation. For C02, the only
present alternative in the regions studied is nuclear power, the
use of which is in direct opposition to many other societal
goals and may not be feasible 150. Any conservation policies
must be joined with sensible and complementary supply-side
policies, as outlined below.
2) Short-term adjustment of present capacity mix:
Within the study's option set, this would indicate the early
retirement option. The analysis indicates that early retirement
at low levels, and in conjunction with conservation, is also
another win-win situation. Retirement could be forced by
standards or encouraged by incentives. Other similar options
might also be available, such as encouraging repowering
(which increases efficiency) over life extension (which de-
creases efficiency).
3) Near-term alteration of capacity use: Of those
options included in the study, this goal can be approached by
150 Many baseload technologies are available with low SO2 emissions, making conservation less
attractive if SO2 is the main concern. The conflicting nature of some CO2 and S02 reduction policies
must be explicitly defined when examining tradeoffs and choosing policies.
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either the dispatch modifier or the carbon tax. Given the
likely high transaction costs and the contradictory long-term
signals of the dispatch modifier, the carbon tax is probably the
better of these two choices. Other alternatives would be the
forced construction and use of natural gas (economically less
efficient and subject to price shocks, but low transaction costs
for implementation and enforcement) or system-wide carbon
caps enforced through tradeable permits (economically
efficient, but very high transaction costs).
4) Long-term alteration of capacity planning: Of the
options examined in the study, the carbon tax is the most
effective long term option for this goal. Bans on the construc-
tion of coal capacity are ineffective in the absence of cheap
baseload alternatives (such as nuclear). Other options might
include the deposit-refund modification to the carbon tax, or
the tradeable permits scheme with gradual reductions in per-
mitted levels.
If nuclear power (or some other inexpensive zero-emissions baseload
technology) becomes available and acceptable for widespread use, the
natural spread in the use of the technology could conceivably achieve all
emissions goals without complex interventionist policies. In fact, when
such an altemative becomes available - as is likely to be the case sometime
in the 21st century - this will mark the end of the "transitional" period of
this study and the beginning of a new transition. Such an occurrence,
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however, is not perceived to be likely, or a wise assumption, for electric
power planning in the intermediate term.
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Chapter Eight - Lessons
What Have We Learned?
Clearly, a specialized study of the electric power sector in two
regions of the United States can not be extrapolated to drive policy for
other sectors or regions. This study was not intended to serve that pur-
pose. There are, however, some general lessons which this study provides
which can be of use for climate change policy formulation beyond its
limited focus.
Lessons for Electric Power in Other Regions and Nations
This study focussed primarily on two regions of the U.S. electric
power industry. Utilities within both of these systems operate under the
same national laws, have access to generally similar technologies, and
attempt to maximize profits given similar constraints. Yet, in spite of these
similarities, the two regions are substantially different, both in their
current contribution to total carbon dioxide emissions and in the policies
which will effectively reduce those emissions. This indicates the most
general lesson to be learned from this study: the formulation of climate
change policies must be regionally sensitive despite the global nature of the
problem. Policies will have varying effectiveness and acceptability within
different regiops which, if not recognized, can render the policies overly
costly or even useless. The study also illustrates that regional differences
apply not only to broadly defined regions, such as the industrialized world
and the developing countries, but can be significant within different regions
of the same country as well.
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These regional differences, in combination with some of the
counterintuitive results of this study, indicate a need for system-oriented
analysis to complement the large-scale long-term models which presently
dominate the literature. In addition to regional differences, many of the
complexities involved with dispatch, technological change, fuel switching,
and interactions between supply and demand side policies are not captured
by large scale models. This study has shown that these factors can be
fundamental to policy effectiveness. That this lesson is already understood
by utilities (they are distrustful of models which do not reflect systemic
realities) makes its understanding all the more important for policy analysts
hoping to influence utility behavior.
Several of the findings of the analysis suggest pitfalls to avoid and
objectives to pursue in the formulation of policies for other electric power
systems. First, the interactions between the supply and demand side are
complex, particularly over the long term. Neither conservation or nuclear
power, for instance, is the environmental or economic panacea which many
advocates claim. Second, environmental emissions are driven by the use of
a limited number of high-emissions technologies. The use of a technology
is driven by many competing factors. The construction of low emissions
capacity, for instance, does not guarantee that the technology will be used,
and may, in fact, cause emissions to rise. Third, for both of the regions
studied, there were several win-win alternatives - altern.:ives which
reduced emissions and lowered costs. Although the total impact of such
alternatives may be small, they provide a significant launching point for the
suggested consensus-building process.
For the U.S. and many industrialized countries, the consensus-
building process will be an effective approach to climate change policy
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formulation. The process will also be useful for the extrapolation to the
international context, since the focus is not on centralized policy
implementation and enforcement (the common barrier to international
agreements). For many centrally planned countries, the consensus-building
procedure will be inappropriate. These countries may, however, be better
equipped to implement and enforce those climate change policies which are
deemed appropriate. We also have seen that in much of the developing
world, climate change policy might best be assisted by successful
demonstration in the industrialized world in conjunction with mechanisms
for technology and information transfer as the dominance of the issue
begins to shift to these nations.
Lessons for Other Sectors
This study makes no attempt to evaluate specific climate change
policy strategies for sectors beyond electric power. Some of the more
general lessons, however, may have application in other sectors,
particularly those which are part of the energy / C02 interaction:
transportation, industry, and commercial / residential buildings. Many of
the same social constraints apply and the institutional settings for other
sectors are similar.
In transportation, for instance, the primary points of intervention are
similar. Fuel production or consumption can be regulated directly.
Automobile manufacturers, like utilities, are limited in number. Although
the industry is not heavily regulated, there is precedent for regulatory
action (on fuel efficiency standards, for instance), and a record of sluggish-
ness with regard to these regulation which is similar to that of the utility
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industry. Finally, the use of automobiles is widespread and decentralized,
as is the use of electricity.
Many of the lessons for electric power would would seem to also
apply here. For instance, the transportation infrastructure and needs of
different regions can be very different. There seems to be little reason to
expect that some climate change policies would not have counterintuitive
effects here as they did with electric power. Finally, it seems that the
consensus-building procedure could be effective here as well. Similar ob-
servations can be made for general industry and the buildings sector.
Lessons for Global Change Policy
Some of the recommendations made within this study may seem, at
the surface, contradictory. The fundamental basis of this study has been
the belief that detailed sectoral studies are necessary for the formulation of
sensible global climate change policies. Yet within the sector studied, the
dangers of selective inattention (inattention to supply side by demand-side
policy proponents, for instance) have been highlighted. If extrapolated to
the general problem, it would seem that this indicates a need for compre-
hensive studies, to avoid the same pitfalls. These are indeed conflicting,
although not mutually exclusive, ideas. The implication of this study is
merely that the need for policy initiatives varies tremendously across
sectors and regions and that similar policy initiatives in different sectors or
regions may have very different outcomes. These differences must be well
understood in order for policy initiatives, whether sector-specific or
comprehensive, to be effective. The first lesson is that only sector-specific
analyses can highlight these differences. The second is that these sector-
specific studies will be of no use if interactions with other sectors are
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ignored. The complementary nature of sector-specific and comprehensive
studies is then apparent.
Methodology aside, it seems clear that the potential outcomes from
climate change policy are scattered over a very large range. Many of these
outcomes probably include reductions in greenhouse gas emissions at mini-
mal cost in conjunction with many other economic benefits, as appears to
be the case with the U.S. electric power sector. It is hoped that the limited
window provided by this analysis helps to highlight those strategies which
are likely to be successful in the electric power sector and thus worthy of
further investigation; it is also hoped that the lessons of this study can be
applied outside this sector to assist in the formulation of sensible climate
change policies.
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